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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 
10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) pursuant to its rule-making authority granted under Section 
10(b), protect investors in business enterprises from securities fraud.1  
These broad anti-fraud provisions allow the SEC to pursue 
enforcement actions against those who, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security, use “any manipulative or deceptive 
device,”2 which includes making “any untrue statement of material 
fact” or omitting a material fact “necessary in order to make the 
statements made . . . not misleading.”3  Additionally, although Rule 
10b-5 is silent as to whether it allows for a private right of action, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the rule to allow shareholders of 
corporations adversely affected by securities fraud to bring private 
claims against violators of the rule.4  
The SEC enforcement mechanism, coupled with the private 
right of action available to shareholders, provides necessary 
protection for investors in an exceedingly complex corporate climate 
that is increasingly rife with securities fraud.5  Indeed, under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the SEC and private litigants can pursue claims 
not only against issuers and corporate insiders, but also against 
culpable secondary actors such as underwriters, accountants, 
investment banks, and lawyers, thereby broadening the net of 
 
 1  Elizabeth Cosenza, Is the Third Time the Charm? Janus and the Proper Balance 
Between Primary and Secondary Actor Liability Under Section 10(b), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1019, 1026–27 (2012).  
 2  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 3  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011). 
 4  Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 
(1971). 
 5  Speaking to corporate fraud generally, the economists Luigi Zingales and 
Adair Morse of the University of Chicago and Alexander Dyck of the University of 
Toronto, in a study pulling from frauds uncovered during the dot-com bubble, 
estimated that in any given year, fraud was being committed by eleven to thirteen 
percent of the “large companies” in the country.  Eduardo Porter, The Spreading 
Scourge of Corporate Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/business/economy/the-spreading-scourge-of 
-corporate-corruption.html.  The last decade has witnessed a boom of corporate 
malfeasance, as evidenced by the scandals involving Enron and WorldCom and, 
more recently, those related to the financial crisis, such as the scandals involving 
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.  Cosenza, supra note 
1, at 1022.  And there is evidence to suggest that the latest uptick is not merely a 
reflection of the business cycle, but rather an indication that corporate corruption 
has become more prevalent over the years.  Porter, supra.  
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potential liability and increasing the protection afforded to investors.6  
But the ability of the SEC and, especially, private litigants to pursue 
claims against both primary and secondary actors has been 
significantly curtailed in recent years.7  The most recent and glaring 
example of this was in 2011 with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders.8 
To be liable for a misrepresentation under 10b-5(b), the 
defendant must have been the “maker” of the false statement.9  The 
Janus decision significantly limits the universe of individuals who can 
be considered a “maker” of a misstatement for purposes of 10b-5 
liability.  Specifically, the Supreme Court held in Janus that, to 
establish a defendant as the “maker” of the alleged misstatements, a 
plaintiff must show that the defendant was the person or entity with 
“ultimate authority” over the misstatements, including their “content 
and whether and how to communicate” them to the public.10  
Therefore, merely participating in the preparation or publication of a 
statement, even if that involvement is significant, is not sufficient to 
subject one to 10b-5 liability as a “maker.”11 
In Janus, the defendant that escaped liability was the investment 
advisor to a mutual fund—a secondary actor.12  But application of 
Janus has not been limited to its facts.  For instance, some 
commentators have already noted the difficulty Janus creates in 
imposing liability on secondary actors other than investment 
advisors—actors such as underwriters, auditors, investment bankers, 
and lawyers.13  Such persons may have significant influence over a 
corporate statement, but they rarely have “ultimate authority” over it.  
And lower courts that have interpreted Janus have routinely found 
that it applies not only to secondary actors, but also to corporate 
insiders such as directors, officers, and employees.14  For lower courts 
 
 6  Private plaintiffs can pursue actions against any “secondary actors . . . ‘who 
have some relationship with the primary wrongdoer.’”  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1022 
(quoting Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 
1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 80 n.4 (1981)).  The SEC is typically more limited in whom 
it can pursue in an enforcement action.  Id. at 1022 n.1. 
 7  See infra Part II for a more complete discussion of the historical development 
of the 10b-5 cause of action. 
 8  131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).  
 9  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011).  This section makes it unlawful “[t]o make 
any untrue statement of . . . material fact.”  Id.   
 10  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 11  Id. 
 12  Id. at 2299. 
 13  See, e.g., Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1070–83. 
 14  See, e.g., Red River Res., Inc. v. Mariner Sys., Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM, 
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analyzing whether a claimant can proceed against a particular 
insider, whether the misstatement was publicly attributed to the 
corporate insider appears determinative—courts have allowed claims 
to proceed where there was attribution and dismissed those where 
there was not. 
Even though lower courts are finding that Janus does not bar 
claims against insiders where there is public attribution, many such 
claims still will ultimately be unsuccessful because a plaintiff may be 
unable to establish that the defendant acted with scienter,15 a 
necessary element to imposition of 10b-5 liability.16  In such cases, 
difficulty arises when the individual to whom a statement is publicly 
attributed—i.e., the person considered to have “ultimate authority” 
under Janus—had no knowledge of its falsity.  If this individual is seen 
as the only potential “maker” of the misstatement, and scienter exists 
only in some other culpable insider, then there will be no corporate 
insider against whom a 10b-5 claim could be pursued. 
After Janus, identifying an individual insider to hold liable is not 
the only problem.  In many jurisdictions, this issue of scienter may 
make it difficult to bring claims against even the issuer to which the 
misrepresentation is attributed.17  A plaintiff typically can establish the 
scienter of a corporation by imputing to the corporation the scienter 
of one or more culpable officers, directors, or employees.  But some 
jurisdictions require, for imputation purposes, that the individual 
with the requisite scienter also be the “maker” of the statement.18  
Such jurisdictions have rejected the theory commonly referred to as 
 
2012 WL 2507517, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2012) (“The holding in Janus is not 
explicitly limited to its facts. . . . [C]ourts have applied Janus to corporate insiders.”).  
See infra Part III.A for a more complete discussion of the application of Janus to 
corporate insiders. 
 15  Scienter is defined as the defendant’s “intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud . . . .”  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 185 (1976).   
 16  See infra Part II.B for a more complete discussion of the elements necessary to 
bring a claim under Rule 10b-5. 
 17  See infra Part III.B.2 for a more complete discussion of the limitations Janus 
may impose on pursuing claims, even against corporate issuers to which 
misstatements are attributed.  
 18  See, e.g., Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 
2008) (holding that the plaintiff must plead scienter “with respect to those 
individuals who actually made the false statements” for such scienter to be imputed 
to the corporate entity); Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 
353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the notion of “collective scienter” and instead 
requiring the plaintiff to establish the state of mind of the individual corporate 
official who made or issued the statement or ordered its making or furnished 
information for inclusion therein for an individual’s scienter to be imputed to the 
corporation).  
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“collective scienter,” which allows a court to impute to the 
corporation the scienter of some or all of its employees, even where 
none of the wrongdoers are necessarily the “maker” or where the 
wrongdoer has not yet been identified.19  As such, in jurisdictions 
rejecting collective scienter, courts may refuse to impute the scienter 
of the individual to the corporation where the individual with 
scienter is not the person who made the misrepresentation.  In the 
wake of Janus, which curtails the universe of potential “makers” of a 
statement, plaintiffs in such jurisdictions may have no defendant with 
the requisite scienter—not even the issuer itself.  Consequently, 
plaintiffs may have no defendant against whom they can pursue a 
10b-5 claim, even in the face of blatant fraud. 
Take, for example, the following hypothetical.  Mr. Smith is the 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) of Corporation X.  Mr. Smith made 
misstatements internally to employees of Corporation X that he knew 
to be false at the time they were made.  These misstatements were 
made in a number of different forms.  For instance, some were made 
on a conference call to various employees and officers.  Others were 
made during presentations to the management team and other 
employees.  Some were made in written commentaries posted on 
Corporation X’s internal website.  The written commentaries bore a 
written warning: “For internal use only.”  Corporation X’s board of 
directors and other members of the management team ultimately 
incorporated some of Mr. Smith’s internal misstatements into public 
disclosures that were communicated to Corporation X’s investors.  
The board and management team (other than Mr. Smith) had no 
reason to suspect that the COO’s statements were false.  Yet there is 
no dispute that the COO’s statements contained misrepresentations, 
and there is no dispute that the COO knew his statements contained 
misrepresentations at the time he made them. 
When Corporation X eventually discovered and revealed the 
misrepresentations, Corporation X’s stock price was negatively 
affected.  Shareholders of Corporation X who purchased stock after 
the misrepresentations were communicated to the investing public 
and before the statements were revealed as false, brought a 10b-5 suit 
against the COO and Corporation X.  At first blush, in the face of 
obvious fraud in the form of admitted false statements by a high-
 
 19  See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 
531 F.3d 190, 195–96 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (applying collective scienter 
to hold that it is possible to establish scienter at the pleading stage without being able 
to name the individuals who devised and disseminated the fraud).  See infra Part 
III.B.2,  for a more complete discussion of the theory of collective scienter. 
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ranking officer, it would seem likely that the plaintiffs would prevail, 
particularly when one considers that certainly the COO in such a case 
would know that his internal communications would likely form the 
basis for public disclosures.  In the wake of Janus, however, the private 
litigants may struggle to find a proper defendant. 
The COO, for instance, can argue, based on Janus, that he did 
not actually “make” the misrepresentations since he did not have the 
“ultimate authority” over the statements, including their “content and 
whether and how to communicate” them to the public.20  Rather, he 
merely made internal communications and had no say in whether or 
when or how such internal communications might ultimately be 
relayed to the public.  The COO could argue it was the board and 
other members of the management team, or the corporation itself, 
that must be seen as the maker of the misstatements.  After Janus, this 
argument would likely be successful and the COO would escape 
liability. 
Moreover, while the shareholder-plaintiffs might have a good 
case that Corporation X, along with individual board members or 
other members of the management team responsible for the public 
disclosure, were the makers of the misstatements for purposes of 
Janus, it is possible that the plaintiffs would not be able to establish 
scienter as to these potential defendants.  Mr. Smith is likely the only 
person in this scenario with the requisite scienter for 10b-5 liability.  
As such, the individual board members or other members of the 
management team responsible for the public disclosure cannot be 
proper defendants in a 10b-5 action.  The scienter of Mr. Smith could 
in theory be imputed to Corporation X for purposes of establishing 
10b-5 liability in a jurisdiction allowing collective scienter.  But in a 
jurisdiction that allows the scienter of only the “maker” to be imputed 
to the corporation, Mr. Smith’s scienter could not be imputed to 
Corporation X because, under Janus, Mr. Smith did not have 
“ultimate authority” over the misstatements.  Corporation X would 
escape liability. 
After Janus, in this realistic scenario concerning undisputed 
wrongdoing,21 a private litigant may be without recourse under the 
federal securities laws.  Moreover, because, as discussed infra, courts 
 
 20  Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2298 
(2011).  
 21  These hypothetical facts do not present a particularly unique or unusual set of 
circumstances.  In fact, they are adapted from a securities fraud case pending at the 
time of this writing in the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division.  
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2–11, SEC v. Dafoitis, No. 11-cv-00137-
WHA (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012), 2012 WL 2848995. 
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are applying Janus to actions instigated by the SEC as well as to 
actions brought by private litigants, even the SEC’s ability to pursue 
such claims in enforcement actions may be hampered. 
This Article explores the repercussions of the Janus decision.  
Rather than focusing on the limitations that Janus imposes on the 
liability of secondary actors such as, in the case of Janus, an 
investment advisor to a mutual fund, this Article looks instead at the 
implications of Janus on the liability of primary actors—the issuer 
itself and its corporate insiders.  Part II of this Article, by way of 
background, discusses how a private suit or an SEC enforcement 
action proceeds under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  Part II includes 
a brief discussion of the history of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 
jurisprudence and the varying avenues of liability that have been 
available to plaintiffs under these rules.  Part II culminates with a 
description of the Janus case. 
Part III of this Article addresses the gaps in liability created by 
Janus.  Specifically, it addresses how lower courts are interpreting 
Janus with respect to the liability of corporate insiders.  It also 
analyzes the potential liability gap for the issuers themselves, which is 
compounded in jurisdictions that have rejected notions of collective 
scienter and only allow scienter to be imputed to the corporation 
from a corporate insider if that insider in fact made the 
misrepresentation at issue.  Additionally, Part III looks at the issue of 
how lower courts are applying Janus to claims under other federal 
securities laws and how such an extension would further widen the 
above-mentioned liability gaps.  Part IV discusses some policy 
considerations that weigh in favor of warranting a more expansive 
view of liability for fraudulent misrepresentations than that permitted 
by Janus.  Finally, Part V proposes some potential solutions to the 
liability gaps established by Janus and its intersection with cases 
rejecting collective scienter. 
II.  BRIEF HISTORY OF SECTION 10(B) JURISPRUDENCE 
A.  Overview of Federal Securities Laws 
In response to the 1929 stock market crash and ensuing Great 
Depression, Congress enacted the first major pieces of federal 
legislation to regulate the offer and sale of securities.  Two of the 
most important pieces of legislation enacted during this time were 
the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) and the Securities 
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Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).22  Often referred to as 
the “truth in securities law,” the Securities Act was aimed at 
disclosure—ensuring that investors receive complete and accurate 
information about a potential investment before purchasing 
securities.23  To oversimplify, the Securities Act can be thought of as 
regulating the disclosures provided to investors in the initial 
distribution of securities—i.e., through the primary market—while 
the Exchange Act can be thought of as regulating trading between 
third parties on the secondary market, after the initial distribution by 
the issuer.24  The Exchange Act was the vehicle through which 
Congress created the SEC, which was given broad authority to 
regulate the securities industry.25 
B.  Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: Establishing a Cause of Action 
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is a crucial mechanism for 
preventing and punishing fraud in the purchase and sale of 
securities.26  Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for anyone, directly or 
indirectly: 
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest 
or for the protection of investors.27 
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Section 10(b), the SEC 
promulgated Rule 10b-5, which makes it unlawful for anyone, directly 
or indirectly: 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in 
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person . . . .28 
 
 22  STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 10 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 2009). 
 23  The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM.,  
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933 (last visited Mar. 17, 2013). 
 24  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 22, at 10. 
 25  The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 23. 
 26  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1026 (noting that 10(b) is an essential tool for 
promoting information integrity). 
 27  15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 28  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).  
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As part of its broad regulatory authority, the SEC can bring 
enforcement actions against violators of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-
5.  The rule is silent regarding whether a private right of action exists 
for violations of the anti-fraud provisions, but the U.S. Supreme 
Court settled the issue over forty years ago, determining that private 
litigants could pursue claims under Rule 10b-5.29  To establish a 10b-5 
claim, a private litigant must prove (a) a material misrepresentation 
or omission made by the defendant, (b) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security, 
(c) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, (d) economic 
loss, (e) loss causation (a causal connection between the material 
misrepresentation and the loss), and (f) scienter.30  When the SEC 
brings a 10b-5 claim, it is required only to show that the defendant 
(a) made a material misrepresentation or materially misleading 
omission, (b) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, 
(c) with scienter.31  While the SEC’s elements to satisfy a 10b-5 claim 
are somewhat less stringent than those of a private litigant in that the 
SEC need not prove reliance, causation, or injury,32 to be successful, it 
still must establish the scienter of the defendant and that the 
defendant “made” the material misstatement.33  These two elements 
are the focus of this Article. 
C.  Aiding and Abetting Liability: Before and After Central Bank 
Historically, plaintiffs invoking the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 
10b-5 for misstatements proceeded under Rule 10b-5(b), regardless 
of whether they were pursuing a primary actor, like the issuer itself, 
or a secondary actor, like an issuer’s accounting firm.34  One question 
 
 29  Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 
(1971).  The existence of a private cause of action is well-settled and has recently 
been affirmed in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 
2296, 2301–02 (2011). 
 30  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008) 
(citation omitted). 
 31  SEC v. Merch. Capital, LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 766 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 32  SEC v. Radius Capital Corp., No. 2:11-cv-116-FtM-29DNF, 2012 WL 695668, at 
*4 n.8 (M.D. Fla. 2012).  
 33  It should be noted that the SEC is not required to comply with the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, which is discussed in more detail infra in Part 
III.B.1.  Therefore, though the SEC and private litigants both have to establish 
scienter, the SEC’s burden may be less onerous than the private litigant’s since the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act imposes heightened pleading requirements 
with respect to scienter.  Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 
(2007).  See also infra n.181.  
 34  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2011).  This subsection, set out in its entirety supra 
in Part II.B makes it unlawful “to make” a material false statement. 
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that arose fairly early in 10b-5 litigation was whether a plaintiff could 
succeed against a defendant who was not necessarily the primary 
violator, but rather was an individual or entity that engaged in some 
preparatory or other activity that helped the primary violator 
perpetrate the fraud.  Prior to 1994, all of the circuits were in 
agreement that the answer to this question was yes: Rule 10b-5 
allowed the SEC and private plaintiffs to assert claims of “aiding and 
abetting” violations of the federal securities laws against, for instance, 
corporate directors and officers or secondary actors like lawyers or 
accountants.35  These defendants were individuals who were not 
responsible for the primary violation itself, but who somehow 
“‘participated’ in the process of issuing a misleading statement.”36  
Courts even allowed inaction by a corporate insider to result in aiding 
and abetting liability, so long as the inaction was supporting a 
primary violation.37  Although there were variations among 
jurisdictions as to the elements of a claim of aiding and abetting, 
generally courts required that a plaintiff establish (a) the existence of 
an underlying primary violation of Section 10(b), (b) the defendant’s 
knowledge of the primary violation, and (c) substantial assistance of 
the violation by the defendant.38 
In 1994, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A.,39 the U.S. Supreme Court put an end to the ability of 
private litigants to use aiding and abetting theories of liability under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  The Court held that private civil 
liability under Section 10(b) does not extend to those who merely aid 
and abet the violation rather than actually engaging in the 
manipulative or deceptive practice at issue.40  In foreclosing plaintiffs 
from using theories of aiding and abetting in securities litigation, the 
Court went against years of unanimous precedent among the lower 
courts allowing for such claims.41  Though the facts and holding of 
Central Bank dealt only with a private right of action under Section 
 
 35  Thomas O. Gorman, Who Does the Catch-all Antifraud Provision Catch? Central 
Bank, Stoneridge, and Scheme Liability in the Supreme Court, 1620 PLI/CORP 189, 198 
(Sept.–Oct. 2007) (PLI Order No. 11072).  
 36  Darryl P. Rains, The Future of Control Person Liability after Janus, 9 SEC. LITIG. 
REP. 10 (2012); see also Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1033.  
 37  See Rains, supra note 36, at 10.  
 38  Gorman, supra note 35, at 199. 
 39  511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 40  Id. at 191. 
 41  Id. at 197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  In so holding, the Court focused on the 
text of the statute itself, noting that it does not reach those who aid and abet a 
Section 10(b) violation.  Id. at 177.   
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10(b), it became clear that the eradication of aiding and abetting 
liability applied not only to private claims, but also to SEC 
enforcement actions.42  In reaction to Central Bank, the Senate held 
hearings within one month of the decision,43 and a year later, 
Congress added Section 20(e) to the Exchange Act, which expressly 
authorizes the SEC to bring 10b enforcement actions for aiding and 
abetting.44  Congress, however, did nothing to extend such claims to 
the private right of action.  Therefore, while the SEC can bring aiding 
and abetting claims under the new statutory authority, private 
litigants were and are still barred from using this theory of recovery.45 
In the aftermath of Central Bank, courts struggled with how to 
address questions of secondary actor liability in private 10b-5 suits 
without running afoul of the Central Bank holding.  Though the 
Court in Central Bank had eliminated the possibility of private actions 
for aiding and abetting violations of the federal securities laws, the 
Court had expressly not foreclosed liability against secondary actors 
altogether, holding that its decision “does not mean that secondary 
actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under 
the securities Acts.”46  According to the Court, any secondary actor 
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement 
or omission on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies “may be 
liable as a primary violator . . . assuming all of the requirements for 
primary liability . . . are met.”47  In attempting to walk the fine line 
between allowing private plaintiffs to bring claims against secondary 
actors for primary violations but still not allowing private plaintiffs to 
bring claims for aiding and abetting, courts devised various standards 
of liability under which to review 10b-5 claims against secondary 
actors. 
Two of the most prominent of the standards of liability were the 
“bright line standard” adopted by the Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, and the “substantial participation test” 
adopted by the Ninth Circuit.48  To be liable under the “bright line 
standard,” a secondary actor must have made the misstatement, not 
 
 42  Gorman, supra note 35, at 201. 
 43  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLP v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 173 (2008) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 44  15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006); see also Gorman, supra note 35, at 201.  The addition 
of Section 20(e) was in connection with the enactment of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, described in more detail infra in Part III.B.1. 
 45  Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158. 
 46  Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. 
 47  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 48  Gorman, supra note 35, at 202–03. 
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just participated in its creation.  Specifically, the defendant must have 
either (a) been named in the document with the misrepresentation, 
(b) have signed the document, or (c) have been identified to 
investors at the time of the dissemination of the misstatement to the 
public.49  To be deemed liable under the less stringent “substantial 
participation test,” the defendant merely needs to have knowingly 
and substantially participated in the preparation of materially false or 
misleading statements.50  In other words, even where there was no 
public attribution of the misstatement to the secondary actor, such 
actor could still have been involved in the deception to a sufficient 
degree to warrant imposing primary liability.51 
A third standard of liability, very similar to the substantial 
participation test, was adopted by the Third Circuit and dubbed the 
“creator standard.”52  Under this test, as under the substantial 
participation test, the defendant need not have been the person who 
made the misrepresentation, nor must the misstatement have been 
publicly attributed to the defendant to create liability.  Rather, the 
plaintiff only had to prove that the secondary actor (a) was aware of 
the misrepresentation, (b) could be considered the author or co-
author of the statement by having participated in the creation of the 
statement, (c) knew the misrepresentation would be relied upon by 
investors, and (d) met the other requirements for 10b-5 liability.53 
The substantial participation and the creator standards gave way 
to a theory of liability referred to by some courts in the post-Central 
Bank era as “scheme liability.”54  Under a theory of scheme liability, 
plaintiffs would proceed not under Rule 10b-5(b), requiring the 
defendant to have made a material misrepresentation or material 
omission, but instead under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c), which allows for 
the imposition of liability on one who employed any “device, scheme, 
or artifice” to defraud and on one who has engaged in “any act, 
practice, or course of business which . . . would operate as a fraud or 
deceit.”55  By using 10b-5(a) and (c) instead of (b), plaintiffs hoped to 
 
 49  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1037. 
 50  Id. at 1043–44. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Id. at 1047. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Gorman, supra note 35, at 214–17. 
 55  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a), (c) (2011).  Because theories of “aiding and 
abetting” had been available to plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5(b) prior to Central Bank, 
courts had previously had little experience applying Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) in the 
context of misrepresentations where the defendant had assisted in the preparation of 
the misstatement but not necessarily been its maker.  ROBERT J. HAFT & MICHELE H. 
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do an “end-run” around the requirement that the defendant be the 
actual maker of the misrepresentation in instances where the 
defendant participated in the fraud, but could not be identified as 
the maker.56  Courts permitting claims of scheme liability generally 
found that the alleged misrepresentations or omissions that formed 
the basis of a Rule 10b-5(b) claim were insufficient evidence of 
scheme liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c).57  A defendant typically 
still could be found liable as part of a fraudulent scheme, however, so 
long as the scheme also encompassed conduct beyond those 
misrepresentations or omissions.58 
Just as some courts began to read scheme liability very broadly to 
incorporate a wide range of secondary actors and counterparties 
within reach as defendants,59 the Supreme Court stepped in to end 
the expansion in its 2008 decision Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC 
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.60 
D.  Limiting Scheme Liability: Stoneridge 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Stoneridge to address 
whether a plaintiff can pursue claims against a defendant who did not 
make a misrepresentation but did participate in a scheme to violate 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.61 
In Stoneridge, the plaintiffs sued Charter Communications, Inc. 
(Charter), a cable operator, for engaging in various practices to 
fraudulently improve its quarterly reports.62  Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 
(Scientific) and Motorola, Inc. (Motorola), each suppliers and later 
customers of Charter, were also named as defendants for 
 
HUDSON, DUE DILIGENCE § 8:25, DUEDILSEC § 8:25 (Sep. 2011). 
 56  See HAFT & HUDSON, supra note 55. 
 57  See, e.g., WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl v. Spot Runner, Inc., 655 F.3d 
1039, 1057 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that a 10b-5(a) or (c) “claim cannot be premised 
on the alleged misrepresentations or omissions that form the basis of a Rule 10b-5(b) 
claim”) (citation omitted); Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 177 (2d Cir. 
2005) (same). 
 58  WPP Luxembourg Gamma Three Sarl, 655 F.3d at 1057–58; SEC v. Lucent Techs., 
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 342, 359 (D.N.J. 2009); S.E.C. v. Patel, No. 07-cv-39-SM, 2009 
WL 3151143, at *6–7 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 2009); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. 
Supp. 2d 433, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 59  These expansive readings of scheme liability seemed in some cases 
indistinguishable from claims asserting theories of aiding and abetting, which of 
course were extinguished by the Supreme Court’s 1994 Central Bank decision.  See 
HAFT & HUDSON, supra note 55. 
 60  552 U.S. 148 (2008). 
 61  Id. at 156.   
 62  Id. at 153. 
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participating in Charter’s scheme to defraud.63  Scientific and 
Motorola provided Charter with cable boxes that Charter then 
supplied to its customers.64  Charter entered into agreements with 
Scientific and Motorola pursuant to which Charter would overpay 
them for each cable box it purchased for a particular period of time, 
with an agreement that Scientific and Motorola would reimburse “the 
overpayment by purchasing advertising from Charter.”65  The 
transactions had no business purpose.  Rather, the transactions 
allowed Charter to record the advertising purchases as revenue, in 
violation of generally accepted accounting principles, and allowed 
Charter to convince its auditor to approve a false financial statement 
showing it met projected revenue and operating cash flow numbers, 
even though it did not.66  As part of the scheme, the companies 
deceived Charter’s auditor by drafting documents to make the 
transactions look unrelated.67 
Charter then filed false financial statements with the SEC, which 
were thereby reported to the public,68 reflecting revenue and 
operating cash flow inflated by approximately $17 million.69  
Motorola and Scientific had no role in preparing or disseminating 
Charter’s financial statements and, in their own financial statements, 
reflected the transactions appropriately according to generally 
accepted accounting principles.70  Because Motorola and Scientific 
allegedly knew or recklessly disregarded Charter’s intention to use 
the transactions to inflate its revenues, and knew investors would rely 
on Charter’s false financial statements, plaintiffs sued Motorola and 
Scientific under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) under a theory of scheme 
liability.71 
In affirming the Eighth Circuit’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suit 
against Motorola and Scientific, the Supreme Court held that 
Charter’s investors could not show they relied on any 
misrepresentations or other acts by Motorola or Scientific, a 
necessary element of a 10b claim.72  The Court held that the plaintiff 
 
 63  Id. 
 64  Id. at 154. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 154. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. at 155. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at 155, 159–60. 
 72  Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159 (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s 
deceptive acts is an essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.”).  
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could not show reliance on the actions of Motorola or Scientific 
except in an “indirect chain” that the Court found “too remote for 
liability.”73  The Court noted that the defendants did not do anything 
that made it “necessary or inevitable for Charter to record the 
transactions as it did” in its financial statements.74  In the Court’s view, 
if it allowed plaintiffs to proceed with their claim, it would revive the 
implied cause of action against any aider and abettor “if he or she 
committed a deceptive act in the process of providing assistance,”75 
contrary to Congress’s determination that such claims should only be 
available to the SEC.76 
But the Court’s holding in Stoneridge did not entirely quell 
expansive interpretations of 10b-5 to allow for imposition of liability 
against secondary actors.  Because the Court cabined its holding to 
the issue of reliance, it did not speak to the larger issue of whether or 
not a defendant must have actually “made” a public misstatement to 
be held liable.77  In fact, the Court specifically stated that it is not 
necessarily the case that “[a]ll secondary actors . . . are immune from 
private suit.”78  Instead, the Court reiterated what it had stated in 
Central Bank—”the implied right of action in § 10(b) continues to 
cover secondary actors who commit primary violations.”79  So, after 
Stoneridge, the question remained open of when a defendant who 
assisted in the preparation of a fraudulent statement, but to whom 
that statement was not actually attributed, could be liable. 
E.  The Meaning of “Make” in Rule 10b-5: Janus 
In 2011, in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,80 the 
Supreme Court finally addressed this issue head-on and provided a 
more definitive statement of when liability can be imposed on a 
secondary actor that participated in a fraudulent misrepresentation.  
 
 73  Id.  The “indirect chain” to which the Court referred was the plaintiff’s 
contention that, had the defendants not assisted Charter, Charter’s auditor would 
not have been blind to the fraud, and the financial statement would have more 
accurately reflected Charter’s financial position.  Id. at 160.  The plaintiffs asserted 
the causal link was sufficient since the financial statement Charter released was the 
foreseeable result of the defendants’ actions.  Id.  But, the Court did not think 
reliance was established, particularly given the fact that the defendants’ actions were 
never disclosed to the public.  Id. at 161.   
 74  Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 161.  
 75  Id. at 162–63. 
 76  Id. at 163.  
 77  HAFT & HUDSON, supra note 55. 
 78  Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166. 
 79  Id. 
 80  131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011). 
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The plaintiffs in Janus were shareholders of Janus Capital Group, Inc. 
(JCG), who filed a private 10b-5 action against JCG and its wholly 
owned subsidiary, Janus Capital Management, LLC (JCM), for 
making false statements in mutual fund prospectuses filed by Janus 
Investment Fund (JIF).81  JCM was the investment advisor and 
administrator for JIF.82  JIF was created by JCG, but was a separate 
legal entity owned entirely by mutual fund investors.83  JCM was 
involved in preparing prospectuses issued by JIF and made those 
available to investors on its own website.84  The Fourth Circuit had 
held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that JCM made the 
misleading statements in the prospectuses, for the purpose of 10b-5 
liability, by having participated in the writing and dissemination of 
the documents.85 
In a ground-breaking—and much-criticized86—5-4 opinion, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit, holding that JCM could 
not be liable because it did not make the statements in question.87  
The Court articulated the rule that, for purposes of 10b claims, the 
“maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority 
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to 
communicate it.”88  The Court went on to say that one who merely 
prepares a statement on behalf of someone else is not its maker.89 
The Court likened the facts of the case to the relationship 
between a speechwriter and the speech giver, stating that, though a 
speechwriter might draft a speech, the person giving the speech is the 
one with ultimate control over the content and thus should take the 
credit or blame.90  The Court also mentioned the relevance of 
 
 81  Id. at 2299–300. 
 82  Id at 2299. 
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. at 2305 n.12. 
 85  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1065. 
 86  See, e.g., Diana B. Henriques, A Mutual Fund Ruling Remains a Head-Scratcher, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012,  available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/business 
/mutfund/effects-of-janus-case-remain-a-mystery-for-mutual-funds.html?pagewanted 
=all; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Janus Capital Group v. First Derivative Traders: Only the 
Supreme Court Can “Make” a Tree, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 29, 2011,  9:27 A.M.), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu 
/corpgov/2011/06/29/janus-capital-group-v-first-derivative-traders-only-the-supreme 
-court-can-“make”-a-tree/; Editorial, So No One’s Responsible, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/opinion/15wed2.html.  
 87  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2299. 
 88  Id. at 2302. 
 89  Id.  
 90  Id.  
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publicly attributing the contents of a disclosure to a particular 
individual or entity.  Specifically, the Court stated that “attribution 
within a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances is 
strong evidence that the statement was made by—and only by—the 
party to whom it is attributed.”91  In so holding, the Court rejected the 
argument, proposed by the United States in its amicus brief, that one 
can “make” a statement by “creating” it or taking part in the creation 
of it, even if the creator is not actually publicly identified.92  The 
United States argued that this interpretation was consistent with the 
ordinary meaning of the word “make,” but the Court found that such 
an interpretation would be inconsistent with the precedent of Central 
Bank and Stoneridge.93 
The Court held that, based on the facts presented, JCM did not 
make the misstatements, but rather only JIF could be seen as the 
maker because only JIF bore “the statutory obligation to file the 
prospectuses with the SEC.”94  Since there was no allegation that JCM 
filed the prospectuses and there was nothing in the filings that 
attributed the statements to JCM rather than JIF, there could be no 
liability against JCM.95  The Court’s decision in Janus, like that in 
Stoneridge, seemed largely motivated by its concern with the expansion 
of the judicially created private cause of action for 10b-5 violations.96 
The Janus decision has been criticized for, among other things, 
the Court’s refusal to recognize the close relationship between a 
mutual fund (e.g., JIF) and its advisor (e.g., JCM).  The Janus funds 
were organized in accordance with industry practice, such that “while 
each mutual fund [was] in fact its own company, as a practical matter 
the management company [ran] it.”97  Therefore, the relationship 
was less like the relationship between a company and its outside 
advisors (such as its lawyers and accountants), and more akin to the 
relationship between a corporation and its corporate insiders.98  For 
 
 91  Id. (emphasis added). 
 92  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 14, 
Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09-
525), 2010 WL 4339892. 
 93  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303–04. 
 94  Id. at 2304. 
 95  Id. at 2305. 
 96  Id. at 2302 (“[W]e are mindful that we must give ‘narrow dimensions . . . to a 
right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute and did 
not expand when it revisited the law.’”) (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008)).  
 97  Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra 
note 92, at 9 (citation omitted). 
 98  Id. at 9.  As one critic of the Court’s decision pondered in disbelief: “Perhaps 
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instance, it is typical in such relationships that the advisor creates the 
mutual fund, selects the fund’s directors, manages its investments, 
and provides other services.99  And since a mutual fund is “little more 
than a paper shell containing its investors’ money,”100 any recovery 
from JIF would be satisfied only from the investors’ own assets.101  
Therefore, ignoring the close relationship between JCM and JIF and, 
consequently, not allowing plaintiffs to pursue a claim against JCM 
left plaintiffs effectively without a remedy.102 
In some ways, the Janus holding is fairly limited.103  On its facts, it 
only applies to a claim brought by private litigants, not the SEC.  And 
it applied only to a 10b-5 claim, not claims brought under a myriad of 
other federal securities or states’ laws.  Moreover, it only applied to 
the relationship between a mutual fund and its investment advisor.  
But in the aftermath of Janus, as the lower courts scramble to 
interpret the ruling, they will be called upon to determine whether it 
applies more broadly.104  Thus far, most courts agree that the Janus 
holding is not limited to private rights of action, but also applies to 
SEC enforcement actions.105  But lower courts seem to be diverging in 
 
the five prevailing justices actually believe that a Janus fund’s board could fire Janus 
and hire T. Rowe Price to manage the fund as easily as it might replace its law firm, 
transfer agent or any other ‘service provider.’”  Henriques, supra note 86. 
 99  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 92, at 9. 
 100  Henriques, supra note 86. 
 101  Darryl P. Rains, Eugene Illovsky & Jay G. Baris, Investment Management: Janus 
and its Impact on Mutual Funds, 25 INSIGHTS: THE CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 3 (2011) (“A 
fund’s only assets, of course, are investor assets. Funds typically have no assets apart 
from assets contributed by investors in exchange for shares issued by the fund. As a 
result, any liability under Rule 10b-5 could be satisfied only from investors’ own 
assets—which is probably not what plaintiffs would have in mind.”). 
 102  Editorial, So No One’s Responsible, supra note 86 (“Only the business trust set up 
to hold the funds can be held liable, though it has no assets of its own to compensate 
plaintiffs in the lawsuit. Which means that there is no one to sue for the misleading 
prospectuses.”).  
 103  Rains et al., supra note 101, at 2. 
 104  As stated by one federal district court, the Janus holding “is not explicitly 
limited to its facts.”  Red River Res. Inc. v. Mariner Sys. Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHX-
FJM, 2012 WL 2507517, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2012). 
 105  See SEC v. Radius Capital Corp., No. 2:11-cv-116-FtM-29DNF, 2012 WL 695668, 
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2012); SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); In re Textron, Inc. S’holders Derivative Litig., 811 F. 
Supp. 2d 564, 574 (D.R.I. 2011); SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6 
(D. Neb. 2011).  See also SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y 2011) 
(“assuming arguendo that Janus’s holding applies to SEC enforcement actions” and 
finding it satisfied); SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (SEC 
conceding “that Janus foreclosed its ability to assert a misstatement claim” since the 
defendants did not have ultimate authority over the statement); In re Flannery, 
Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *42 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011); Bryan 
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their interpretations of other aspects of the Janus holding, much as 
they did in the wake of Central Bank and Stoneridge.  And the fact that 
courts are applying Janus both to private suits and SEC actions makes 
the answers to these developing questions all the more pertinent. 
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF JANUS: LIABILITY GAPS 
One question courts have had to grapple with is whether Janus 
should be extended beyond the mutual fund/investment advisor 
relationship to other secondary actors or, even more broadly, to 
corporate insiders.  And if the ruling should be so extended, courts 
must determine to what extent.  Since the Court in Janus did not 
define what it means to have “ultimate authority” over a 
misstatement, applying the Janus holding to corporate insiders is a 
complicated question and one to which the Supreme Court did not 
provide obvious answers.106  Additionally, courts will have to 
determine what effect Janus has on plaintiffs’ ability to establish 
scienter in 10b-5 claims.  This will be as true in jurisdictions that have 
historically accepted theories of collective scienter as it is in those that 
reject such theories.  Finally, courts must decide whether Janus 
should be limited to 10b-5 actions or should also apply to claims 
brought under other similar federal securities laws, such as Section 
17(a) of the Securities Act.  Again, the Janus opinion provides little 
guidance in this regard.  In Part III infra, this Article analyzes some of 
the responses of the lower courts to these questions and the 
implications of Janus as it is applied in cases that will begin to work 
their way through the appellate process. 
 
 
P. King, The Effects of an Undefined “Ultimate Authority” Standard for Rule 10B-5 Claims: 
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 405, 430 
(2012)  (“[T]he Court did not provide one definition of the word ‘make’ for private 
actions, and a separate definition for SEC actions.”).  But see SEC v. Pentagon Capital 
Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377, 421–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Janus was a private suit, 
not an enforcement action brought by the SEC. . . .  There is no indication that the 
Court or Congress intended for actions brought by the SEC to be so limited.”); 
Henriques, supra note 86 (“Federal district judges in Manhattan have come down on 
opposite sides of the question of whether the Janus decision applies at all in 
regulatory cases filed by the S.E.C. . . . “).  The application of Janus to SEC 
enforcement actions is not unlike what was seen in the aftermath of the Central Bank 
decision.  Though that case applied on its facts only to the private 10b-5 right of 
action, it became generally accepted in the wake of the Court’s holding that it would 
apply equally to SEC enforcement actions brought under Rule 10b-5.  Gorman, supra 
note 35, at 201.  
 106  Rains et al., supra note 101, at 2 (“Janus . . . establishes ‘ultimate authority’ as 
the standard without ever identifying the source of that authority.”). 
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A.  Limitations of Liability on Corporate Insiders: The Importance of 
Attribution 
Critics of Janus have focused on the ways in which Janus, when 
applied outside the mutual fund context, will limit the liability of 
other secondary actors like auditors, underwriters, and lawyers—a 
seemingly natural extension of the Janus ruling.107  In addition to 
limiting the liability of secondary actors, however, it does not take a 
particularly broad reading of Janus to see how it will also potentially 
limit the liability of corporate insiders.108  In fact, this was one of the 
concerns expressed by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Janus.  The 
dissent pointed out that, under the majority’s rule, in the situation 
where “guilty management writes a prospectus (for the board) 
containing materially false statements and fools both board and 
public into believing they are true,” no one would be liable because 
no one on the management team was the “maker” of the 
misstatements under Janus.109  That is because it is the unknowing 
board in this scenario that has ultimate authority over the issuance of 
the statement, and not the members of management who actively 
engaged in the fraud. 
Corporate executives facing 10b-5 claims have begun to invoke 
Janus “to argue that they are merely hired hands at their companies—
like the management company hired by a mutual fund” and, as such, 
 
 107  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1078 (“Outside advisers are the traditional 
gatekeepers of the securities markets, on whom investors rely to ensure complete and 
accurate disclosure.  Under the Janus standard, outside advisers do not face the 
prospect of liability for their conduct under Section 10(b) and will remain 
undeterred under the current legal regime.”); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP, PRIVATE 
SECURITIES FRAUD CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 10(B) BASED ON FRAUD OR MISLEADING 
STATEMENTS 1, 4 (2011), available at http://www.sullcrom.com/files/Publication 
/b3ae77c9-1dc3-4bf4-a0c4-a5580c78376c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment 
/048148f3-258c-43dc-9fb7-a5f31912ecb3/SC_Publication_Private_Securities_Fraud 
_Claims_Under_Section_10b.pdf (“The Supreme Court’s opinion in Janus could 
have significant implications for (i) those, such as accountants, consultants, and 
attorneys, who help securities issuers prepare and publish public disclosures, and (ii) 
those, such as advisers and corporate parents, that may be alleged to have significant 
influence over an issuer’s business affairs and public disclosures.”); King, supra note 
105, at 426 (“The initial effect is a major victory for outside advisors in that there is 
now precedent and authority granting them de facto immunity from 10b-5 suits.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 108  Rains, supra note 36, at 11 (“Janus may well have ended primary Rule 10b-5 
liability for corporate officers and directors in most contexts.  Usually, a corporation 
will be the ‘maker’ of a statement.  No individual will be exposed to primary liability 
under Rule 10b-5, because no individual will have had ultimate authority over its 
content or mode of communication.”). 
 109  Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2310 
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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are not liable for any fraudulent information disseminated by their 
corporate employers.110  Though there seems to be little doubt that 
Janus applies to corporate insiders,111 courts are not at all uniform in 
determining how it should apply. 
For instance, some courts have found that there is no 10b-5 
liability for insiders who merely participated in the preparation of the 
false statements that ultimately appeared in public filings—these 
insiders simply were not “makers” of the statements under Janus.112  
Hawaii Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole113 is a good illustration of 
this line of cases.  In that case, the defendants were corporate officers 
who had allegedly falsified financial information that was 
incorporated into “overly optimistic public statements” made by 
other officials of the corporation.114  The court held that Janus 
applied to corporate insiders as well as secondary actors,115 and found 
that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the Janus requirement of showing 
 
 110  Henriques, supra note 86.  Such arguments gain more traction in light of post-
Janus cases that have held there is no duty of one who assists in the preparation of 
materials to correct any errors in the public transmission of such materials by the 
person or entity with “ultimate authority” over that transmission.  Fulton Cnty. Emps. 
Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., 675 F.3d 1047, 1051–52 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 111   Most courts addressing the issue of whether Janus applies to situations 
involving corporate insiders have assumed without discussion that it does.  See, e.g., In 
re Stillwater Capital Partners, Inc. Litig., 853 F. Supp. 2d 441, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); 
Allstate Life Ins. Co. Litig., No. CV-09-8162-PCT-GMS, 2012 WL 1900560, at *5 (D. 
Ariz. May 24, 2012); City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lender Processing 
Servs., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-1073-J-32JBT,  2012 WL 1080953, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 
2012); City of Roseville Emps. Retirement Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 
2d 395, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011); SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 
2011); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-WHA,  2011 WL 5871020, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6 
(D. Neb. 2011); In re Merck & Co., Sec, Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., No. 2:05-cv-
02367-SRC-MAS, 2011 WL 3444199, at *25 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. 
C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011).  Only a few 
courts have specifically addressed the issue and expressly held that Janus applies.  See, 
e.g., Red River Res., Inc. v. Mariner Sys., Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 
2507517, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 29, 2012) (“The holding in Janus is not explicitly 
limited to its facts. . . . courts have applied Janus to corporate insiders.”); Haw. 
Ironworkers, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 WL 3862206, at *3 (N.D. Oh. Sep. 1, 2011) 
(“Plaintiff asserts that, ‘[i]n essence, Janus involves a secondary actor’ and thus ‘Janus 
does not analyze whether corporate executives can be liable.’ . . . [But] nothing in 
the Court’s decision in Janus limits the key holding . . . to legally separate entities.”). 
 112  Kerr v. Exobox Techs., CV No. H-10-4221, 2012 WL 201872, at *12 (S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 23, 2012); In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at 
*41 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011); Haw. Ironworkers, 2011 WL 3862206, at *5; Mercury Interactive, 
2011 WL 5871020, at *2.  
 113  Haw. Ironworkers, 2011 WL 3862206. 
 114  Id. at *1. 
 115  Id. at *3. 
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that the defendants—corporate insiders—had “ultimate authority” 
over the misstatements.116  The court pointed out that the defendants 
were required to meet a mandatory six percent profit-margin increase 
for the division for which they were in charge of financial reporting 
to senior officers.117  They had “no choice” but to increase forecasts to 
meet the new six percent benchmark.118  The defendants’ superiors, 
who ultimately incorporated the false forecasts into public 
statements, knew that the six percent requirement was 
“unobtainable” and therefore the underlying data would have to have 
been manipulated to show compliance.119  Essentially, the defendants 
had merely sent the results “they were commanded to send” and had 
no real authority over their issuance.120  In other words, 
notwithstanding their fraudulent conduct, because they were not 
“makers” under Janus, they were not liable. 
In an administrative proceeding addressing the liability of 
insiders, the SEC’s Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) went even 
further in her refusal to impose 10b-5 liability on a corporate insider.  
In In re Flannery, the ALJ determined that an insider would not be 
liable for making five presentations to clients using a chart that he 
knew included misrepresentations.121  The insider did not prepare the 
presentation but he was asked to review and correct material in the 
presentation, and he was responsible for giving the presentation.122  
The ALJ found that, though he was asked to make corrections in the 
presentation, this did not give him ultimate authority over its 
contents or distribution.123  Additionally, the insider prepared a draft 
of a “client-friendly letter” which he sent to other management 
professionals within the company.124  When he circulated the letter, 
 
 116  Id. at *5. 
 117  Id. at *4. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Haw. Ironworkers, 2011 WL 3862206, at *4. 
 120  Id. at *5. 
 121  In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *38 (ALJ 
Oct. 28, 2011) (initial decision).   
 122  Id. 
 123  Id.  It should be noted that this outcome seems inconsistent with the use of 
the speechwriter versus speech giver analogy used by the majority in Janus to justify 
the “ultimate authority” test.  Here, the insider was in fact the equivalent of the 
“speech giver”—he gave the presentation in which the misrepresentations were 
made.  Yet the court found he was not the one with ultimate authority since he did 
not prepare it—i.e., he was not the speechwriter.  The result here seems directly 
contrary to the Janus Court’s determination that it is the speech giver, not the writer, 
who has ultimate authority.  Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. 
Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011). 
 124  In re Flannery, 2011 WL 5130058, at *41. 
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he stated that recipients could send it out or suggest improvements.125  
It was undisputed that the insider defendant did not have authority to 
send the letter out, beyond circulating it internally.126  A senior officer 
ultimately sent out the letter.127  Because the defendant did not send 
the letter out to clients, did not sign the letter, and was not 
mentioned in the letter, the ALJ found that he did not have ultimate 
authority over the letter, and therefore could not be subject to 10b-5 
liability.128 
Other courts, however, have imposed 10b-5 liability on corporate 
insiders, finding their level of involvement in the preparation of the 
public statement to be sufficient to consider them the individuals 
with “ultimate authority” over the making of the misstatement, 
thereby satisfying Janus.129  For instance, in In re Merck & Co. Securities, 
Derivative & “ERISA” Litigation, one of the defendants was an officer 
of Merck, holding the positions of “Executive Vice President for 
Science and Technology and President of Merck Research 
Laboratories.”130  He had signed some of Merck’s public filings with 
the SEC and these filings contained misrepresentations.131  
Additionally, he had been quoted in articles and reports, conveying 
additional misrepresentations to the public.132  The court held that 
the 10b-5 claim could proceed against this officer based on the 
misrepresentations publicly attributed to him.133 
The distinguishing factor between most post-Janus cases dealing 
 
 125  Id. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Id. 
 128  Id. 
 129  In re Stillwater, 853 F. Supp. 2d 441, 453 (S.D.N.Y 2012); Red River Res., Inc. v. 
Mariner Sys., Inc., No. CV 11-02589-PHX-FJM, 2012 WL 2507517, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 
29, 2012); City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lender Processing Servs., 
Inc., No. 3:10-cv-1073-J-32JBT, 2012 WL 1080953, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2012); In 
re Pfizer Inc., Sec. Litig, 2012 WL 983548, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012); SEC v. 
Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); City of Roseville Emps. Retirement Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc., 
814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 
4375787, at *6 (D. Neb. 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 
3295139, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); In re Merck & Co., Sec, Derivative & “ERISA” 
Litig., No. 2:05-cv-02367-SRC-MAS, 2011 WL 3444199, at *25–26 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 
2011); SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 
2011); SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 154 (S.D.N.Y 2011); Local 703 I.B. of 
T. Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 2011 US Dist. LEXIS 
93873, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2011).   
 130  In re Merck, 2011 WL 3444199, at *25. 
 131  Id. at *24–25. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. at *25.  
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with corporate insiders—those finding potential liability and those 
finding no liability—appears to be this issue of attribution.  In other 
words, the majority of cases that have found potential liability of 
corporate insiders involve public statements that have in some way 
been attributed to the corporate insider, such that the investing 
public knows that person played a large role in the preparation of the 
misstatements and is ultimately responsible for them.134  Courts have 
justified these results by looking to the language of Janus itself, which, 
at least in dicta, discusses the issue of attribution.  Specifically, the 
Supreme Court stated that “attribution within a statement or implicit 
from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a statement 
was made by . . . the party to whom it is attributed.”135  Therefore, the 
interpretation by lower courts that an express attribution of a 
statement to someone in a public filing identifies that person as the 
“maker” of the statement seems reasonable. 
But in addition to express attribution, the language from Janus 
allowing for “implicit” attribution “from surrounding circumstances” 
leaves open the possibility that courts may impose liability on 
corporate insiders even in the absence of an express attribution in a 
public statement to the individual insider defendant.  At least two 
post-Janus cases, each out of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
 
 134  Compare Kerr v. Exobox Techs., CV No. H-10-4221, 2012 WL 201872, at *12 
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2012) (holding that there was no information suggesting the 
officer defendant contributed to the statement issued by another officer of the 
corporation and therefore plaintiffs failed to properly plead a 10b-5 cause of action), 
and In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *41 (ALJ 
Oct. 28, 2011) (holding that, though the defendant insider had drafted the letter 
that was ultimately sent to investors, since the insider had no authority to send the 
letter, did not sign the letter, and his name did not appear on it, he could not be 
considered its maker), and City of Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (holding that 
certain corporate insider defendants could not be liable partly because neither 
signed the registration statement at issue), with Das, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6 (“As the 
CFOs who signed and certified the statements, [the defendant officers] were the 
persons with ultimate authority and control over the content of the statements and 
whether and how they were communicated.”), and In re Stillwater, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 
287–88 (“Janus . . . cannot be used to shield [the officer], who signed the documents 
at issue and thereby ‘made’ the alleged misstatements.”), and In re Flannery, 2011 WL 
5130058, at *46 (holding that defendant could be considered the maker of 
misstatements in a letter when “he initiated it, wrote the first draft, approved the 
edits, signed it, and directed that it be sent out.”), and City of Roseville, 814 F. Supp. 2d 
at 417 (“Because all of the [officer defendants] signed the July 2008 Registration 
Statement, all are proper defendants on the claims regarding alleged misstatements 
in that document.”). 
 135  Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 
(2011).  The Court went on to state that, when a statement is being “made” 
indirectly, rather than directly, attribution is necessary to find that the defendant was 
the maker.  Id. at 2305 n.11. 
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District of New York, have imposed liability in such scenarios.136  It is 
likely that these two cases will be reversed on appeal because they 
seem to adopt a meaning of “maker” that is the equivalent of 
someone who is considered one of the “creators” of a statement—an 
interpretation that was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Janus.137  In fact, it seems likely that appellate courts will find that 
these factual scenarios—involving an officer who participated in the 
creation of a misstatement but to whom the misstatement was not 
publicly attributed—are difficult to distinguish from claims of aiding 
and abetting, which are limited to SEC enforcement actions and are 
not available to private litigants.138  Regardless of outcome on appeal, 
the question will likely remain as to what constitutes “implicit” 
attribution capable of satisfying Janus. 
It is not just the cases involving implicit attribution that are at 
risk on appeal.  Even the cases described above that allow explicit 
attribution to satisfy Janus might ultimately be reversed.  Litigants 
have argued, for example, that under Janus, even express attribution 
is not sufficient, but rather the test is one of control.139  Therefore, for 
 
 136  In re Pfizer Inc., Sec. Litig, 2012 WL 983548, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) 
(holding that, even though the statements in the company’s press releases were not 
explicitly attributed to the insider defendants, the case could proceed against the 
defendants since Janus recognized attribution could be “implicit from surrounding 
circumstances”); SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 155 (S.D.N.Y 2011) (holding 
that the plaintiffs’ claim could proceed against an insider executive who had 
generated fraudulent materials that misrepresented the company’s financial 
performance but who had not been identified in any of the public 
misrepresentations as their author since there were adequate surrounding 
circumstances to conclude the misstatements were implicitly attributable to the 
defendant). . 
 137  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303–04 (“The Government contends that ‘make’ should 
be defined as ‘create.’ . . . Adopting the Government’s definition of ‘make’ would . . . 
lead to results inconsistent with our precedent.  The Government’s definition would 
permit private plaintiffs to sue a person who ‘provides the false or misleading 
information that another person then puts into the statement.’”). . 
 138  See supra notes 39–47 and accompanying text.  
 139  Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, SEC v. Daifotis, No. 11-cv-
00137-WHA, 2012 WL 2848995 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2012).  While control may in fact 
be relevant to the inquiry, control alone as we think of it in the corporate context—
e.g., a parent controls its one-hundred percent owned subsidiary—is not enough to 
satisfy the “ultimate authority” test of Janus.  For instance, in In re Optimal U.S. 
Litigation, Optimal Management Services (“OIS”) owned one-hundred percent of 
Optimal Multiadvisors, Ltd. (“Multiadvisors”).  No. 10-cv-4095-SAS, 2011 WL 
4908745, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2011).  The plaintiffs asserted OIS participated in 
the preparation of certain explanatory memoranda made available to investors by 
Multiadvisors.  Id.  Since these explanatory memoranda contained material 
misrepresentations, the plaintiffs brought a 10b-5 claim against OIS.  Id. at *1.  The 
court held that, just because OIS owned one-hundred percent of Multiadvisors and 
was able to appoint and remove Multiadvisors’ directors at will, this was not sufficient 
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instance, where a defendant insider is quoted in marketing materials, 
but claims not to have made the quoted statement, the only potential 
defendants would be the individuals who actually drafted and issued 
the marketing materials, despite the public attribution of the 
statement to the defendant insider.140  This argument seems to go 
against the majority of the lower court decisions analyzing the effect 
of express attribution as described above.  The argument may gain 
traction, however, as attribution alone certainly does not seem to be 
the equivalent of the “ultimate authority” the Janus holding demands 
before an individual will be deemed the maker of a statement.  While 
the Janus language refers to attribution as being “strong evidence” 
that a person was the maker of a statement,141 it may not be sufficient 
standing alone as the only evidence to satisfy the “ultimate authority” 
test. 
This argument that attribution alone is insufficient to satisfy 
Janus is not the only potential cause for reversal of the lower court 
decisions that have allowed 10b-5 claims to proceed against corporate 
insiders.  Litigants may also argue that Janus stands for the 
proposition that there can be only one “maker” of a misstatement, 
further limiting the liability of the team of corporate insiders often 
involved in public disclosures.  The language in Janus regarding 
attribution states that attribution is strong evidence that a statement 
“was made by—and only by—the party to whom it is attributed.”142  
Some have interpreted this to mean that there can be only one 
person or entity liable for a particular misstatement in a 
misrepresentation disclosed to investors.143  Though lower courts do 
not appear to be adopting this interpretation,144 most courts have 
 
to satisfy the Janus test.  Id. at *5.  The court found that plaintiffs were “conflating 
shareholder control with ‘ultimate authority’” and found such argument to be 
unavailing.  Id. at *5.  While such “control” through one-hundred percent ownership 
of an issuer could be sufficient to establish control person liability under Section 
20(a) of the Exchange Act, a claim for control person liability is considered a 
secondary action that requires an underlying primary violation by the controlled 
person or entity in order to be actionable.  Id. at *4, *8. 
 140  Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 139 at 5.  
 141  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 142  Id. 
 143  James D. Redwood, To Make or to Mar: The Supreme Court Turns Away Another 
Securities Law Plaintiff, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 463, 495–96 (2012) (“[N]othing in logic or 
linguistics compels the conclusion that a statement, or indeed anything else, has to 
have one and only one ‘maker.’  The Court’s ‘either-or’ approach is thus ill-
founded.”); Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1074 (“Janus . . . limit[s] liability under section 
10(b) to the person or entity with ‘ultimate authority’ over the statement.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 144  In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enter. Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 828, 861 (S.D. Ohio 2012) 
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ignored the issue and seem simply to assume without deciding that 
there can be more than one maker.  If, as these cases work their way 
through the appeals process, the circuit courts determine there can 
be only one “maker” of a statement under Janus, either the corporate 
entity or the corporate insider could be liable, but not both.  
Moreover, presumably only one corporate insider could be liable for 
a given misrepresentation, ignoring the realities of the marketplace—
that public disclosures “reflect a combined work product” of 
potentially numerous individual wrongdoers.145 
As indicated by the above discussion, many questions still remain 
for courts addressing the issue of individual liability in the post-Janus 
world.  Notably, even if circuit courts agree that express attribution is 
sufficient to establish an insider as a maker of a statement, courts will 
need to decide what kinds of actions constitute express attribution.146  
For instance, in In re Flannery, described in more detail above, the ALJ 
seemed to indicate attribution was important when she refused to 
impose liability on a defendant who drafted a letter, but was not the 
one who signed it or sent it out.147  Yet, in that same case, the ALJ 
found no liability for the defendant who gave a presentation but was 
not the one who created it.148  It would seem as though, by giving a 
presentation, one would be publicly identifying himself as the maker 
 
(rejecting the defendant’s “either-or” contention that the document containing the 
misstatement could only belong to the issuer or its placement agent and finding that 
it was appropriate to find that the misstatements could be attributed to both parties); 
City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 359, 
374 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“It is not inconsistent with Janus Capital to presume that 
multiple people in a single corporation have the joint authority to ‘make’ an SEC 
filing, such that a misstatement has more than one ‘maker.’”); City of Roseville 
Emps. Retirement Sys. v. Energysolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 417 n.9 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The Supreme Court’s statement does not imply that there can be 
only one ‘maker’ of a statement in the case of express or implicit attribution.”). 
 145  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1050.  One critic of this potential implication of 
Janus that there may be only one “maker” has analogized this issue to other areas of 
law.  Redwood, supra note 143, at 496.  For instance, in the case of tort liability arising 
from an injury incurred from faulty construction, courts allow for plaintiffs to pursue 
anyone who was responsible for the injury.  Id.  In other words, courts do not engage 
in the fictional assumption that there can be only one maker of a building.  Id.  If the 
injury is caused by something defective in both design and construction, for 
example, a plaintiff could pursue both the architect and the contractor.  Id.  The 
dissent in Janus similarly analogized to other areas of law, focusing specifically on 
criminal law.  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The dissent pointed 
out that pursuant to criminal law principals, one is guilty as a principal “when one 
uses an innocent third party to commit a crime.”  Id. 
 146  Rains et al., supra note 101, at 7. 
 147  In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *41 (ALJ 
Oct. 28, 2011). 
 148  Id. at *38. 
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of the statements contained therein, but this was not the case 
according to the ALJ.149  If making a presentation (or giving a speech, 
to use the analogy asserted by the majority in Janus) is not enough to 
satisfy attribution, courts will have to identify what additional facts are 
required. 
Similarly, courts will have to determine whether a Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) Section 302 certification constitutes express attribution 
for purposes of determining ultimate authority.150  In a large 
organization, the realities of the process of preparing corporate 
disclosure filings are such that, though one person may sign the 
disclosure documents, the responsibility for the language and 
content of such filings may lie with a team of individuals.151  As such, 
courts will have to determine whether liability can be imposed on a 
CFO, for instance, solely because of his signature on a filing pursuant 
to SOX requirements. 
At least one court has addressed this issue since Janus.  In City of 
St. Clair Shores General Employees’ Retirement System v. Lender Processing 
Services, Inc., the court viewed the signing of SOX certifications as 
direct attribution sufficient to satisfy Janus, at least when combined 
with the other facts that some of the individual defendants had made 
statements quoted in press releases in their official capacities.152 
But this approach is not without critics, who note that SOX 
certifications do not always indicate ultimate authority.153  
 
 149  Id. 
 150  Rains et al., supra note 101, at 7.  Under SOX, senior executives of public 
companies must certify the accuracy of quarterly and annual financial reports.  15 
U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2006).  Each officer must certify that he and other officers are 
“responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls[,]” which they have 
designed “to ensure that material information” of the issuer will be reported “to such 
officers by others within” the entity.  15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)(A).  Moreover, the 
officers must certify that they have “evaluated the effectiveness of the issuer’s internal 
controls” within the previous ninety days and have “presented in the report their 
conclusions about the effectiveness of their internal controls.”  15 U.S.C. § 
7241(a)(4)(C)–(D).  
 151  Scott M. Himes, Implications of “Janus” for Securities Fraud Liability of Corporate 
Insiders, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticle 
NY.jsp?id=1202520766667&slreturn=20130217160926; King, supra note 105, at 426. 
 152  City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 
No. 3:10-cv-1073-J-32JBT, 2012 WL 1080953, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2012). 
 153  Rains, supra note 36, at 11 (“It could be argued that some corporate 
statements are attributable . . . to corporate directors or executives.  For example, 
chief executives and chief financial officers sign Sarbanes-Oxley certifications, chief 
executives and chief accounting officers sign periodic reports, directors sign 
registration statements, and executives make oral statements to investors or the 
public.  But a signature on a disclosure document rarely means the signer had 
ultimate control over the document or the power to change its contents, and 
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Additionally, even if public attribution—such as the signing of a SOX 
certification—is enough to satisfy the “ultimate authority” test, it is 
not at all clear that such claims could be successful at trial based on 
an inability to establish the scienter necessary for a 10b-5 claim.154  For 
instance, if a CFO signs a SOX certification for filings prepared by 
other corporate officers or employees, where those preparers knew of 
the misstatements in the materials but the CFO did not, a plaintiff 
will have a difficult time establishing the scienter of the CFO.  Prior 
to Janus, some circuits held that a SOX certification is “only probative 
of scienter if the person signing the certification was severely reckless 
in certifying the accuracy of the financial statements.”155  According to 
such courts, if a SOX certification alone, with nothing more, was 
enough to provide the requisite inference of scienter, scienter would 
automatically be adequately pled any time “it is alleged that an 
accounting error . . . made by a publicly traded company was later 
uncovered.”156  Even if the plaintiff can establish that the defendant 
should have known of the violations, according to these courts it is 
insufficient to meet the heightened pleading requirements for 
scienter in 10b-5 cases.157  Thus, it follows that if the CFO in this 
scenario is the “maker” of the statement for purposes of Janus, but 
only the employee who prepared the materials to give to the CFO has 
the requisite state of mind, plaintiffs will be unable to identify a 
proper 10b-5 defendant.  Though courts are willing to impute 
scienter of an individual wrongdoer to the issuer itself,158 as discussed 
 
suggestions that any one signer might have veto power are often overblown.”). 
 154  See supra note 30 and accompanying text for the elements of a 10b-5 claim. 
 155  Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th Cir. 2006).  See also 
Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Garfield in holding that SOX certification is only relevant to scienter if the person 
signing was severely reckless); Ind. Elec. Workers’ Pension Trust Fund IBEW v. Shaw 
Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 544–45 (5th Cir. 2008) (same).   
 156  Stevens v. InPhonic, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 105, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  While a 
plaintiff may be able to use the fact that defendants failed to check information they 
had a duty to monitor in order to support a showing of scienter, scienter cannot be 
established by the “bare inference [alone that the] defendant ‘must have had 
knowledge of the facts.’”  Id. at 120 (citation omitted).  Therefore, filing a SOX 
certification alone is insufficient to adequately plead scienter and to hold otherwise 
would “eviscerate the heightened pleading requirement[s]” of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  Id. (citation omitted).  The requirements of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act are described in more detail infra Part 
III.B.1.  
 157  Glazer, 549 F.3d at 748.  Heightened pleading requirements for scienter were 
instituted by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, described in more detail 
infra Part III.B.1. 
 158  There is precedent for imputing the scienter of an individual, and in some 
jurisdictions a group of individuals, to the corporate entity by which the individual is 
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in more detail in Part III.B.1 infra, scienter of one corporate insider 
cannot be imputed to a different insider.159 
Factual scenarios such as this can already be seen in the cases 
currently working their way through the lower courts and SEC 
administrative proceedings.  For instance, in In re Flannery, described 
above, the defendant did not have ultimate authority over a letter 
because he did not send it out or sign it, nor was he identified as its 
author.160  Yet he was the individual who prepared the contents of the 
draft letter and circulated it to more senior managers.161  In such 
scenarios, if the person who signed and sent the letter—and thus had 
“ultimate authority”—did not know of the falsity of the letter’s 
contents, such individual would not likely be found liable for a 10b-5 
violation due to a lack of scienter. 
In sum, it is possible that on appeal, circuit courts will determine 
one or more of the following: (a) express attribution, on its own, is 
not enough to satisfy the Janus “ultimate authority” test or, if it is, 
what constitutes “express attribution” is very limited; (b) there can 
only be one “maker” of a misstatement after Janus; or (c) an 
unknowing officer who signs a public filing, while the “maker” of the 
statement, does not have scienter sufficient to establish a 10b-5 claim.  
One or more of these findings—particularly in combination—could 
be devastating to the 10b-5 cause of action.  Such limitations could 
make it nearly impossible for private litigants or the SEC to assert 
claims against corporate insiders.  Combined with the challenges 
Janus poses for bringing suits against secondary actors, potential 
plaintiffs are left with only the remedy of pursuing the issuer itself.  
And, as discussed in Part III.B. infra, even the ability to pursue the 
issuer may be significantly limited by Janus. 
B.  Limitations of Liability on Corporate Issuers: Inability to Impute 
Scienter 
Janus not only potentially limits the 10b-5 liability of corporate 
insiders and secondary actors, but, when combined with previously 
existing precedent, may also limit the liability of even the corporate 
 
employed in 10b-5 suits against the corporate issuer.  See infra note 182 and 
accompanying text. 
 159  Therefore, in this scenario where the CFO is the maker but another employee 
has the scienter, if courts were to impute the employee’s scienter to the CFO, rather 
than to the corporation itself, this would have to involve an expansion of the concept 
of imputed scienter. 
 160  In re Flannery, Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *41 (ALJ 
Oct. 28, 2011). 
 161  Id. 
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issuers in whose name the misrepresentation was made.  This is 
because, as discussed in more detail in this Part, many courts will only 
impute the scienter of an individual agent within the corporation to 
the corporation itself if that individual with the requisite state of 
mind is also the individual who was the maker of the misstatement.  
In such jurisdictions—i.e., those that reject the theory of “collective 
scienter”—it may be only in the most limited of circumstances that a 
plaintiff will be able to successfully plead that the corporation had the 
required state of mind for a 10b-5 claim.  In these jurisdictions, cases 
in which the lower courts have allowed the plaintiffs to proceed 
against the issuer based on express attribution of a public statement 
to a particular individual may be reversed on appeal for failure to 
establish the scienter of the identified individual insiders.162  If this is 
the case, not only will plaintiffs be barred from pursuing culpable 
individuals, but they also would be barred from pursuing the 
corporation itself.  In other words, plaintiffs will be left with no 
remedy at all. 
1.  Pleading an Issuer’s Scienter in 10b-5 Cases 
As discussed in Part II.B. supra, scienter is a necessary element in 
both private causes of action and SEC enforcement actions asserting 
10b-5 liability.163  To establish scienter, a plaintiff must show that the 
defendant had “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.”164  To understand the issue of imputed 
scienter and collective scienter, it is necessary to first understand the 
special pleading requirements for establishing scienter in 10b-5 cases.  
In order to survive a motion to dismiss on a 10b claim, in addition to 
satisfying the pleading requirements of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), a plaintiff must also satisfy the 
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the FRCP.165  Rule 
9(b) requires that a party alleging fraud “state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud.”166  As such, the plaintiff must, 
 
 162  See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 163  See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 164  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976); see also Frank v. 
Dana Corp., 646 F.3d 954, 959 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Scienter may take the form of 
knowing and deliberate intent to manipulate, deceive, or defraud, and 
recklessness.”) (citation omitted); Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective 
Scienter in SEC Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 2 (2009) (“Scienter 
generally refers to intent or knowledge of wrongdoing.”). 
 165  SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 166  FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).  Where fraud is not at issue, the federal notice pleading 
standards of FED. R. CIV. P. 8 apply, which merely require that a complaint contain a 
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.  
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among other things, specify the fraudulent statements, explain why 
they are fraudulent, and identify the speaker.167  Initially, courts of 
appeals diverged with regard to the meaning of Rule 9(b) in 10b 
cases, particularly with respect to its effect on the pleading 
requirements for scienter.168  For instance, some courts found it was 
sufficient merely to plead that scienter existed, while other courts 
required plaintiffs to allege particular facts giving rise to the 
inference of scienter.169  In 1995, Congress attempted to clarify this 
disagreement through the enactment of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).170 
One of the purposes of enacting the PSLRA was to curb abusive 
securities litigation while still allowing meritorious suits to proceed to 
enforce federal antifraud securities laws.171  Through the PSLRA, 
Congress effectuated this goal by, among other things, imposing 
certain demanding pleading requirements.  For instance, the PSLRA 
establishes a more stringent rule for inferences involving scienter in 
securities litigation.172  Specifically, with respect to scienter, the 
PSLRA requires that the plaintiff “state with particularity facts giving 
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required 
state of mind.”173  At the time it enacted the PSLRA, however, 
Congress left the meaning of “strong inference” undefined, leading 
to a division in the circuit courts as to how it should be interpreted.174  
For instance, the Seventh Circuit took a more lenient approach to 
the pleading requirement, finding that a complaint would survive if it 
alleged facts from which a reasonable person could infer the 
defendant acted with the requisite intent.175  The Sixth Circuit, on the 
other hand, took a more strict approach, finding that a complaint 
would only survive if the plaintiff asserted the most plausible of 
competing inferences.176 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lender 
Processing Servs., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-1073-J-32JBT, 2012 WL 1080953, at *2 (M.D. Fla. 
Mar. 30, 2012).  
 167  Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 168  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319–20 (2007). 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. at 320. 
 171  Id. at 313, 322. 
 172  Id. at 313–14.  
 173  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). 
 174  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314. 
 175  Id. at 317. 
 176  Id.  In other words, the issue came down to whether courts should consider 
competing inferences in determining whether an inference of scienter is considered 
“strong” for purposes of the statute.  Id. at 322. 
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In 2007, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in Tellabs, 
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.177  In Tellabs, the Supreme Court 
adopted the more strict of the competing interpretations of the 
PSLRA’s scienter pleading requirement, holding that a plaintiff must 
plead facts that make the inference more than merely plausible or 
reasonable.178  Instead, the plaintiff must plead facts that render an 
inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing 
inference.179  In so holding, the Court also stated that it must consider 
the complaint in its entirety because the question is whether all of the 
facts taken collectively give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not 
whether any individual allegation meets that standard.180  If the 
pleading requirements of the PSLRA are not met, a court must grant 
a defendant’s motion to dismiss.181 
2.  Imputing Scienter to the Corporation 
When the defendant in a 10b-5 action is the corporation itself, 
typically the easiest way to raise an inference of scienter is to plead 
scienter for a particular individual within the corporation.182  The 
scienter of the individual wrongdoer, an agent of the corporation, 
can then be imputed to the corporation.183  In other words, courts are 
generally in agreement that, when the corporate insider who made 
the misrepresentation acted with scienter, that scienter can be 
imputed to his or her corporate employer to establish the elements of 
a 10b-5 claim against the issuer itself.184 
The more problematic question historically has been whether 
scienter can be imputed to the corporation from a group of insiders, 
where the one particular wrongdoer within the corporation is not the 
“maker” of the misstatement or has not necessarily been identified.185  
The willingness of courts to impute scienter of an individual 
 
 177  551 U.S. 308 (2007).   
 178  Id. at 314. 
 179  Id. at 328. 
 180  Id. at 322–23. 
 181  City of St. Clair Shores Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 
No. 3:10-cv-1073-J-32JBT, 2012 WL 1080953, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2012).  It 
should be noted that the heightened pleading requirements set forth in the PSLRA 
apply only to private causes of action, not to enforcement actions filed by the SEC. 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2006); SEC v. Landberg, 836 F. Supp. 2d 148, 153 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011). 
 182  Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 
190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 183  Bondi, supra note 164, at 2–3.   
 184  Id.   
 185  Id. 
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corporate agent to the corporation itself has evolved out of theories 
of respondeat superior.186  But respondeat superior as a theory does 
not work when the individual who engaged in the act itself—such as 
making a false statement—is not the same person as the one who has 
scienter.187  As such, plaintiffs have argued that the scienter of one or 
a collection of corporate agents should be combined to establish the 
required state of mind of the corporation itself.188  Courts willing to 
do this—to impute scienter to the corporation from the assumed 
collective knowledge of all or some combination of its employees—
have done so under a theory that has been referred to as “collective 
scienter.”189 
Essentially three lines of cases have developed with respect to 
collective scienter—those that apply a strong version of collective 
scienter, those that apply a “watered-down” version of collective 
scienter, and those that reject collective scienter altogether.190  Under 
the strong version of collective scienter, courts allow plaintiffs to 
plead scienter based on the aggregate knowledge of all of the 
employees of a corporation without pleading scienter to any 
particular corporate agent.191  For instance, when a corporation 
makes a dramatic announcement that is wildly false, this supports an 
inference of scienter because such an announcement would have had 
to have been approved by corporate insiders who had enough 
knowledge about the company to know the announcement was 
false.192 
Other courts have not rejected collective scienter outright but 
have applied a more limited version of the theory.  These courts find 
that, so long as a specific “member of management knew or should 
have known” that a statement was false, the scienter can be imputed 
to the corporation, even where “that member of management was 
 
 186  Id. 
 187  Id. at 7. 
 188  Id. 
 189  Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 
190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008).  See also Bondi, supra note 164, at 3.  Some courts have 
applied the functional equivalent of a collective scienter theory without labeling it as 
such.  See, e.g., City of Monroe Emps. Retirement Syst. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 
651, 684 (6th Cir. 2005).  Additionally, some courts refer to a similar theory of 
“group pleading.”  Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 
363 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 190  Bondi, supra note 164, at 7.   
 191  Id. at 10.  See also City of Monroe, 399 F.3d at 684; Teamsters Local 445, 531 F.3d 
at 195. 
 192  Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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not the person who made the alleged misstatement.”193  In other 
words, instead of allowing scienter to be imputed from the aggregate 
knowledge of all of the employees, courts in these jurisdictions 
require the plaintiff to show that at least one member of 
management knew or should have known of the falsity before the bad 
actor’s state of mind will be imputed to the issuer.194 
Finally, at least six circuits have rejected collective scienter 
altogether, instead requiring that, to impute scienter from an 
individual to the corporation, the individual with scienter must also 
be the same individual who actually made the misstatement.195  Even 
jurisdictions that were once friendly to notions of collective scienter 
have subsequently questioned whether the theory survived the 
adoption of the PSLRA in 1995.196  Some courts have interpreted the 
PSLRA, in combination with the Tellabs holding, as requiring that 
plaintiffs attribute the misleading statements upon which the 10b-5 
claim is based to a particular defendant.197  For instance, in Southland 
Securities Corporation v. INSpire Insurance Solutions, Inc., the Fifth Circuit 
held that collective scienter cannot survive in light of the PSLRA, 
focusing on the PSLRA’s language requiring the plaintiff to set forth 
allegations of misstatements with respect to “the defendant.”198  The 
repeated references in the PSLRA’s pleading requirements to “the 
defendant,” according to the court, must be read to mean “each 
 
 193  Bondi, supra note 164, at 12–13. 
 194  Id. at 13. 
 195  Id. at 7.  The Eleventh, First, Third, Ninth, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits have all 
rejected collective scienter.  Id. at 8, n.27; see, e.g., Stevens v. InPhonic, Inc., 662 F. 
Supp. 2d 105, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Southland Sec. Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions, 
Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 364–65 (6th Cir. 2005); Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 
1015, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 
736, 745 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that collective scienter would not satisfy the PSLRA 
in the case before it, but declining to decide whether, in some circumstances, it 
might be possible to plead scienter under a collective theory); Part III.B.1 supra. 
 196  Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326, n.6.  See also Monk v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 10-4841-
FLW, 2011 WL 6339824, at *10 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2011) (“[T]he Third Circuit made 
[it] clear . . . that the so-called group pleading doctrine is no longer viable, and any 
private securities fraud claims against corporate officers ‘must be pleaded with the 
specificity required by the PLSRA with respect to each defendant.’”) (quoting Winer 
Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 337 (3d Cir. 2007)).  Since the heightened 
pleading requirements for scienter established by the PSLRA only apply to private 
10b-5 claims and not to SEC enforcement actions, however, it is unclear whether 
collective scienter as a theory would be available to the SEC even in jurisdictions that 
otherwise refuse to recognize such claims.  Until at least 2009, all of the judicial 
decisions involving collective scienter involved private claims, not SEC enforcement 
actions.  Bondi, supra note 164, at 4. 
 197  In re Coinstar Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C11-133-MJP, 2011 WL 4712206, at *3 (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 6, 2011). 
 198  Southland, 365 F.3d at 364. 
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defendant,” thereby eliminating the ability to plead scienter based on 
the aggregate of individuals within a corporation.199  Additionally, the 
court held that even if a corporate insider’s position within the 
corporation supports an inference that he would have been negligent 
in not learning of the falsity in the document that was released to the 
public, the PSLRA requires more than negligence to satisfy the 
scienter requirement for 10b-5 liability.200 
In so holding, the court in Southland made it clear that, in the 
Fifth Circuit, allegations against defendants as a group are not 
imputable to any individual defendant (such as the corporation) 
unless the connection between the individual defendant and the 
misstatement is properly pleaded.201  To ensure that the connection is 
“properly pleaded,” the plaintiff must plead with particularity facts 
showing the state of mind “of the individual corporate official or 
officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it or 
its making or issuance, or who furnish information or language for 
inclusion therein, or the like).”202  Ultimately, the knowledge 
necessary to form the requisite intent cannot be imputed to the 
corporation based on “disconnected facts known by different 
agents.”203 
Janus will potentially have an effect in jurisdictions that 
historically have permitted theories of collective scienter.  For 
instance, in such jurisdictions, a split may be developing over whether 
collective scienter can survive Janus or whether such jurisdictions 
must now reject the theory.204  Even in jurisdictions that have 
 
 199  Id. at 364–65. 
 200  Id. at 365–66; see also Fulton Cnty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv. Corp., 675 F.3d 
1047, 1050 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The most the complaint’s allegation could support is 
the proposition that [the corporation’s] managers should have seen the looming 
problem, but that’s negligence rather than the state of mind required for fraud.”); In 
re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 828, 866 (S.D. Ohio 2012) 
(“Negligence does not suffice; there must be ‘an extreme departure from the 
standards of ordinary care,’ such that the danger of misleading buyers is ‘either 
known to the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of 
it.’”) (quoting Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 946 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1991)).  
 201  Southland, 365 F.3d at 365. 
 202  Id. at 366. 
 203  Id. at 367 (quoting Gutter v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 
1311 (S.D. Fla. 2000)). 
 204  For instance, one lower court in the Second Circuit has asserted that “group 
pleading is alive and well” in the aftermath of Janus.  City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. 
Retirement Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11-cv-5026-JSR, 2012 WL 2866425, at 
*14 (S.D.N.Y. July. 13, 2012).  Another lower court, however, has stated that “it is 
uncertain whether [the group pleading doctrine] survived Janus.”  Orlan v. 
Spongetech Delivery Sys., Inc.,  2012 WL 1067975, slip op. at 10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 
2012).   
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historically refused to allow plaintiffs to use collective scienter 
theories to establish corporate scienter, the effect of Janus moving 
forward is of equal importance.  To illustrate, in Southland, as 
discussed above, the court held that scienter would only be imputed 
if the person with the requisite state of mind was also the person who 
made the statement.205  Prior to Janus, several individuals could be 
viewed as having “made” the statement.  But after Janus, the sphere of 
individuals who can be considered to have “made” the statement has 
shrunk, as discussed in Parts II.E and III.A supra.206  Therefore, if the 
employee who had knowledge of the falsity of the statements being 
issued is not the same person as the employee with “ultimate 
authority” over the statements, the scienter of the individual cannot 
be imputed to the corporation.  In such instances, not only will a 
plaintiff be unable to pursue a claim against the individual “maker,” 
but the plaintiff will also be without a remedy against the corporation 
itself. 
To illustrate this point further with a hypothetical, assume the 
V.P. of Finance of Corporation X supplies false financial data to the 
CFO of Corporation X to include in the company’s public filings.  
The CFO neither knows, nor has reason to know, that the 
information is false.  Corporation X makes the filings, which contain 
the CFO’s signature.  After Janus, the V.P. of Finance likely cannot be 
pursued under 10b-5 as the maker of the statement.  That leaves only 
the individual CFO or the corporation itself, either of which—or 
both, if Janus is read to allow for more than one maker—could 
arguably be seen as the statement’s maker.  But the V.P. of Finance is 
the only individual with the requisite scienter and, in jurisdictions 
disallowing collective scienter, this scienter cannot be imputed to the 
corporation or the CFO.  Jurisdictions rejecting collective scienter 
have made it clear that the fact that the plaintiff can show that a 
different executive—someone other than who made the 
misstatement—knew about the falsity of the statements would do 
nothing to save that plaintiff’s claim from dismissal.207 
Arguably, some of the cases from jurisdictions rejecting 
collective scienter can be read more broadly than the above 
discussion would suggest.  For instance, in Southland, the court does 
not limit the individual from whom the scienter can be imputed to 
the maker of the statement alone.  Rather the court states that it will 
look to the state of mind of the officials who made the statement and 
 
 205  Southland, 365 F.3d at 366. 
 206  Rains, supra note 36, at 12. 
 207  Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 744–45 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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to those who “order[ed] or approve[d]” the issuance of the 
statement, or who “furnish[ed] information or language” to include 
in the statement.208  This would allow scienter to be imputed to the 
corporation even if the plaintiff was unable to establish that the 
individual with scienter was the same person who had ultimate 
authority over that statement for purposes of Janus.209  But other 
courts rejecting collective scienter have not used the broad language 
used by the Fifth Circuit in Southland.  For instance, the Ninth 
Circuit, in rejecting collective scienter in Glazer Capital Management, 
LP v. Magistri, said that scienter can only be imputed from the 
individual to the corporation if the “officer making the statement has 
the requisite level of scienter.”210  Moreover, in the aftermath of Janus, 
many courts have yet to test whether corporate scienter could be 
inferred from those who merely “furnish[ed] information or 
language” to the maker of the statement.  It would not require an 
overly broad reading of Janus and the collective scienter cases to 
conclude that it could not.211 
Because Janus may do away with theories of collective scienter 
altogether, the prediction of the dissent in Janus may in fact come to 
fruition, where “guilty management” could incorporate “materially 
false statements” into public filings and “fool[] both board and 
public into believing they are true.”212  Not only would it be 
impossible for a plaintiff to assert a claim against the individuals—i.e., 
the guilty management—but in a jurisdiction that rejects collective 
scienter, it may also be impossible for a plaintiff to assert a claim 
against the issuer itself.  The majority in Janus used the analogy of the 
relationship between a speechwriter and speech giver to support its 
holding that it is the speech giver, not the speechwriter, who has 
ultimate authority over the communication.213  But it is easy to see 
how this analogy breaks apart when viewed in light of the other 
elements of a 10b-5 action—in reality, the speech giver often does not 
 
 208  Southland, 365 F.3d at 366. 
 209  Thus, in the above-described hypothetical, the scienter of the V.P. of Finance 
might be imputed to the corporation since the V.P. of Finance furnished 
information to the CFO for inclusion in the public statement.   
 210  Glazer, 549 F.3d at 744 (quoting Apple Computer Inc., Sec. Litig., 243 F. Supp. 
2d 1012, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).  In other words, Glazer does not allow imputing 
scienter from those who merely furnished information or language to include in the 
statement.  
 211  Rains, supra note 36, at 12 n.14 (“Southland’s logic seems to limit the state of 
mind inference to the corporate officials who ‘make’ a statement within the meaning 
of Janus.”).  In other words, the broad language in Southland might not survive Janus.   
 212  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 213  Id. at 2302. 
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have the requisite scienter. 
C.  Expansion of Janus Beyond 10b-5 Claims 
Janus may serve to limit the liability of secondary parties, 
corporate insiders, and corporate issuers even further through its 
application to claims brought under federal securities laws other than 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5(b).  For instance, lower courts have 
had to address whether Janus applies only to claims of 
misrepresentation brought under Rule 10b-5(b) or whether it also 
should apply to cases involving scheme liability brought under Rule 
10b-5(a) or 10b-5(c).  In SEC v. Kelly, the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that Janus would apply in cases of 
scheme liability that involve defendants “who did no more than 
facilitate preparation of material misrepresentations or omissions 
actually communicated by others.”214 
Other courts have had the opportunity to determine whether 
Janus extends even beyond Rule 10b-5.  For example, a handful of 
lower courts have had to opine on whether Janus should be extended 
to claims brought under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act.215  Under 
Section 17(a), it is unlawful: 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue 
statement of a material fact or any omission [of] material 
fact . . . or (3) to engage in any . . . course of business 
which . . . would operate as a fraud . . . upon the 
purchaser.216 
Litigants arguing in favor of applying Janus to 17(a) claims point 
out that the elements of a claim under 17(a) are essentially the same 
as those under 10b-5.217  And to succeed in a 17(a) claim for 
misstatement, the SEC must prove that the defendant made 
materially false statements or omissions, just as it would have to prove 
if it were bringing a misstatement claim under 10b-5.218  In fact, the 
 
 214  SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation omitted). 
 215  SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 07-C-4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at *14–15 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012); SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377, 
421–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Perry, No. CV-11-1309R, 2012 WL 1959566, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. May 31, 2012); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-WHA,  
2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 
WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at*5–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011); Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 
345. 
 216  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006). 
 217  Reply Brief in Support of Daifotis’s Motion for Reconsideration at 12, SEC v. 
Dafoitis, No. 11-cv-00137-WHA, 2011 WL 7095660 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2011). 
 218  Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d at 345; SEC v. Trabulse, 526 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1004 
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SEC’s primary purpose in adopting 10b-5 was to make the same 
prohibitions contained in 17(a), which applies in connection with the 
offer and sale of a security, applicable to purchases of securities as 
well.219  Conversely, litigants arguing that Janus should not apply to 
Section 17(a) claims generally point out that the operative word in 
10b-5 that was the subject of the Janus ruling—”make”—is not even 
included in Section 17(a).220  Rather under Section 17(a), it is 
unlawful for one “to obtain” money or property “by means of” any 
untrue statement that is used to perpetrate the fraud.221  Nowhere 
does Section 17(a) require that it be the one who obtains the money 
or property be the same as the one who has made the untrue 
statement.222  Moreover, since Janus is silent with respect to 17(a) 
claims, the holding should not be extended to that provision.223  
Some litigants have also looked to the policy underlying the Janus 
decision, arguing that Janus was aimed at narrowing the definition of 
“make” under Rule 10b-5 so as to curb the expansion of private suits 
under that rule.224  Since only the SEC can bring actions under 
Section 17(a), however, there is no concern of expansion of the 
private right of action, and therefore the Janus definition of “make” 
should not be applied.225 
At the time of writing this Article, most district courts that have 
considered the issue have refused to apply Janus to Section 17(a) 
claims.226  But at least two courts have held that the Janus requirement 
that the “maker” of a statement be the one with “ultimate authority” 
 
(N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 219  Reply Brief in Support of Daifotis’s Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 
217, at 12. 
 220  Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Daifotis’s Motion for 
Reconsideration at 9, SEC v. Daifotis, No. 11-cv-00137-WHA, 2011 WL 7095645 (N.D. 
Cal. July 6, 2011); see also Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *5; Mercury Interactive, 2011 
WL 5871020, at *3.  
 221  15 U.S.C. § 77q(a). 
 222  Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Daifotis’s Motion for 
Reconsideration, supra note 220, at 10 (citing SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 128 
(1st Cir. 2008)) (“[P]rimary liability may attach under Section 17(a)(2) even when 
the defendant has not himself made a false statement in connection with the offer or 
sale of a security.”). 
 223  Id. at 9. 
 224  Id. at 11. 
 225  Id.  
 226  See, e.g., SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 07-C-4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at 
*14–15 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012); SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 
2d 377, 421–22 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-
WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-
00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139, at*5–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011). 
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over it applies to misstatement claims brought under 17(a)(2), just as 
it would apply to claims brought under 10b-5(b).227  The issue is still 
largely untested as only a handful of district courts have as yet 
analyzed the issue. 
While the question of application of Janus to Section 17(a) 
claims has thus far received the greatest amount of attention, litigants 
have also argued that Janus should apply to claims brought under two 
other federal securities laws—Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and 
Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act. 
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act proscribes the solicitation of 
proxies “by means of” false or misleading statements.228  To date, one 
court has addressed whether Janus should be extended to Section 
14(a) claims.  In S.E.C. v. Mercury, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California held that Janus does not apply to 
claims brought under Section 14(a) because the language of the 
statute does not include the word “make.”229  Similarly, at least one 
court has refused to extend Janus to claims brought under Section 
34(b) of the Investment Company Act.230  Section 34(b) makes it 
“unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material 
fact in any registration statement, application, report, account, 
record, or other document filed or transmitted.”231  Though the 
language of Section 34(b) includes the operative word “make,” in 
S.E.C. v. Daifotis, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California held that Janus should still not apply because that case was 
limited to primary violations of Rule 10b-5.232  The rationale behind 
the Janus decision focused largely on the need to limit the scope of 
the implied private right of action.233  Since there is no private right of 
action under Section 34(b), the same rationale does not apply, 
according to the court.234 
While most courts addressing this issue have determined that 
Janus should not be extended outside of 10b-5 claims, not enough 
 
 227  SEC v. Perry, No. CV-11-1309R, 2012 WL 1959566, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 
2012); SEC v. Kelly, 817 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  At least one 
administrative decision has also taken this position.  In re Flannery, Exchange Act 
Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *35 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011).   
 228  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2006); 17 CFR § 240.14a-9(a) (2011).  See also, Mercury 
Interactive, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3. 
 229  Mercury Interactive, 2011 WL 5871020, at *3. 
 230  Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6. 
 231  15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (2006).  
 232  Daifotis, 2011 WL 3295139, at *6. 
 233  Id. 
 234  Id. 
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courts have considered the issue yet for this holding to be considered 
a trend.  And if these cases do not hold up on appeal, and Janus is 
applied to an even broader universe of federal securities claims, 
private litigants and the SEC’s ability to pursue violators of the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws will be further hamstrung. 
IV.  POLICY REASONS FOR MORE EXPANSIVE 10B-5 LIABILITY 
As discussed above, Janus could have potentially far-reaching 
effects that limit the ability of private litigants and the SEC to pursue 
claims against violators of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws.  Specifically, as courts attempt to apply Janus outside 
of the mutual fund context, there will certainly be further restrictions 
on the ability to bring claims against other secondary actors, such as 
accountants, lawyers, investment banks, and underwriters.  But in 
addition to restrictions on secondary actors, plaintiffs will also have 
more difficulty bringing claims against corporate insiders and even, 
in some jurisdictions, against the issuers themselves if theories of 
collective scienter are rejected. 
Due to the complexities of the public disclosure process, 
particularly in large publicly traded companies, the notion that one 
person or entity has “ultimate authority” over any given publicly 
transmitted representation is unrealistic.235  After Janus, this reality of 
diffused responsibility in the creation of public filings and other 
publicly disclosed corporate statements will make it difficult to find 
an appropriate defendant in securities fraud actions for corporate 
misrepresentations.236  And since the Janus holding has been 
extended to enforcement actions, the SEC is similarly limited by the 
holding.  Moreover, it is possible that the SEC’s ability to bring claims 
under other securities laws—not just Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—
may be affected as well. 
The ability of private litigants and the SEC to pursue violators of 
the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws has historically 
been viewed as necessary to support the three main purposes of the 
 
 235  Himes, supra note 151 (“The signing of an SEC or a SOX certification by a 
senior officer is meaningful conduct—but does signing alone mean that one has 
‘ultimate authority’ over all of the contents of a document, when many others 
perform significant roles for the corporate-reporting function? . . . The complex 
realities of corporate public disclosures may present uncertainty whether a given 
insider actually has final authority over supposed misstatements.”).  
 236  King, supra note 105, at 426 (“In a large organization, the ‘ultimate authority’ 
over language may be diffused and seemingly shared between many parties.  In such 
a situation, the court will find it difficult to determine which party actually has 
‘ultimate authority’ without extensive discovery and a trial.”). 
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federal securities laws: “(1) deterrence of fraud, (2) compensation of 
victims, and (3) increase of confidence in investor markets.”237  The 
need for stringent securities regulation is as compelling now as it ever 
has been.  The unraveling of the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme, the 
discovery of the widespread fraud involved in the mortgage scandals, 
the still-lingering questions about potential wrongdoing that 
occurred in connection with the resulting financial crash, and, most 
recently, the uncovering of the Libor rate-rigging scandal are just a 
few indicators from the past five years that corporate securities fraud 
is, more than ever, a powerful force. 
The success of the U.S. markets relies heavily on investor 
confidence in the integrity of the markets.238  The ability of the SEC 
and private litigants to hold wrongdoers accountable for violations of 
the federal securities laws supports the integrity of the markets by 
giving investors faith that appropriate measures are in place to deter 
fraud and, when necessary, punish wrongdoers and compensate 
victims.239  It is no coincidence that the U.S. markets are both the 
safest and the strongest in the world.240  To maintain this investor 
confidence, the private right of action against wrongdoers must 
remain strong. 
The Supreme Court in Stoneridge, Central Bank, and Janus 
expressed its concern over expanding the private cause of action for 
10b-5 violations.241  While the Court still recognizes the implied 
private right of action,242 it has attempted to reverse the decades of 
expansion of that right.243 
One reason asserted for limiting the private right of action is to 
curb the frequency of attorney-driven strike suits that subject 
innocent corporations, insiders, and secondary actors to expensive 
discovery and litigation, with the goal of extracting large nuisance 
 
 237  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1027. 
 238  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 174 n.10 
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 239  Id. 
 240  Id. at 175. 
 241  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.  
 242  The private right of action is referred to as an “implied” right because neither 
the language of Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 expressly provides for that right.  But 
district courts first began recognizing the right in 1946, and the Supreme Court 
validated the private right of action in 1971.  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1027 n.31. 
 243  Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 
(2011); see also King, supra note 105, at 411–12; Andy Seitz, Case Note, Securities 
Law—The Implied Private Right of Action Under Rule 10B-5 Does not Extend Liability to 
Aiders and Abettors, 42 CUMB. L. REV. 425, 439 (2011).  
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settlements.244  While certainly the prevalence of abusive litigation is 
an important concern, the goals of deterring meritless suits on the 
one hand and protecting innocent investors from fraud on the other 
are not mutually exclusive.  For instance, Congress attempted to 
satisfy both goals simultaneously with the implementation of the 
PSLRA in 1995.  In enacting the PSLRA, Congress recognized the 
need to balance the important interest of encouraging meritorious 
private suits to enforce federal antifraud securities laws with the 
interest of corporations in avoiding abusive litigation.245 
The heightened pleading requirements of the PSLRA strike that 
balance, “requir[ing] plaintiffs to state with particularity both the 
facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing 
scienter.”246  The PSLRA appropriately limits the private right of 
action by imposing certain exacting substantive and procedural 
requirements on would-be plaintiffs, thereby protecting corporations 
from strike suits.  This should sufficiently address the concern 
expressed by the Supreme Court in Stoneridge and Janus about the 
expansion of the private right of action without overly narrowing the 
scope of who can be considered a “maker” of a statement,247 to the 
point of rendering the 10b-5 private right of action toothless.  Yet in 
the face of the Supreme Court decisions since Central Bank that 
further narrowed the private right of action under 10b-5, the PSLRA 
has yet to achieve the balance it seeks; rather, “fraud has become 
increasingly prevalent.”248 
The Supreme Court’s decisions curtailing the 10b-5 private 
cause of action are not without their supporters.  Those who support 
this line of cases point to the benefits of predictable rules as one 
 
 244  Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 163–64.  For instance, it is not uncommon for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to file suit based solely on a significant change in the issuer’s stock price or 
a restatement of financials, without regard to any actual wrongdoing of the issuer in 
the hope that, through discovery, they might uncover a plausible cause of action.  
Brief for Attorney’s Liab. Assurance Soc’y, Inc., As Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent , at 10 n.2, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 
148 (2008) (No. 06-43), 2007 WL 2363261. 
 245  Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007). 
 246  Id. 
 247  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. 
 248  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1083.  And the perpetrators of these frauds are often 
repeat players.  Edward Wyatt, Promises Made, and Remade, by Firms in S.E.C. Fraud 
Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08 
/business/in-sec-fraud-cases-banks-make-and-break-promises.html?pagewanted=all 
(“Nearly all of the biggest financial companies [on Wall Street, including Citigroup], 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America among 
them, have settled fraud cases by promising the S.E.C. that they would never again 
violate an antifraud law, only to do it again in another case a few years later.”). 
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reason for the narrow interpretation of the right.249  But the “ultimate 
authority” test set forth in Janus is far from providing a bright-line 
rule and, as illustrated in Part III supra, certainly does not lend itself 
to predictable results.  Moreover, the realities of the creation and 
publication of corporate statements, particularly within large, 
publicly traded corporations, make it difficult to apply the Janus rule.  
A rule requiring the identification of one person (or entity), and one 
alone, who has “ultimate authority” over statements issued to the 
public, when really the process of disclosure is a complex one 
involving diffuse responsibility of a team of individuals, will lead to 
inconsistent results, as evidenced by lower courts’ interpretation and 
application of  Janus.  Moreover, attributing “maker” status 
automatically to the signatory of the document containing the 
misstatement seems an imprecise means of designating fault. 
Supporters of Janus would also argue that the SEC enforcement 
arm is sufficient protection for investors and deterrence for 
wrongdoers.250  Yet the SEC is just as limited as private litigants by the 
Janus decision.  As noted above, though Janus only involved a private 
action, courts have almost uniformly found that Janus applies equally 
to SEC enforcement actions.251  It is true that the SEC has certain 
causes of action available to it that are not available to private 
litigants, which some supporters of Janus have used to suggest that 
the SEC enforcement arm still adequately protects investors.252  For 
instance, the SEC can bring claims of aiding and abetting against 
potential violators of 10b-5, claims which are not available to private 
litigants after Central Bank.253  But in order to bring a claim of 
secondary liability—such as an aiding and abetting claim under 
Section 20(e) of the Exchange Act or a control person liability claim 
under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act254—the SEC must first 
 
 249  Brief for Attorney’s Liab. Assurance Soc’y, Inc., As Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent, supra note 244, at 5. 
 250  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 166 (2008) 
(“The enforcement power is not toothless.  Since September 30, 2002, SEC 
enforcement actions have collected over $10 billion in disgorgement and penalties, 
much of it for distribution to injured investors.”). 
 251  See supra note 105 and accompanying text.  This is very similar to what 
happened in the aftermath of Central Bank.  Though that case only involved a private 
10b-5 action, courts subsequently imposed the holding—that claims of aiding and 
abetting were no longer available under 10b-5—on the SEC as well.  This became 
accepted such that it took Congressional action for aiding and abetting claims to be 
available to the SEC.  See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
 252  King, supra note 105, at 430. 
 253  See supra text accompanying note 44.   
 254  Section 20(a) creates a cause of action against individuals who exercise 
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establish an underlying primary violation.255  Since Janus will apply to 
any primary violation the SEC seeks to litigate, the SEC’s ability to 
establish the requisite underlying primary violation will be limited.  
Without the ability to establish the underlying violation, the SEC will 
be unable to utilize its claims of secondary liability against those 
wrongdoers who participated in the fraud.  And the fact that the 
Janus holding may ultimately be extended to litigation under other 
securities laws like Section 17(a) of the Securities Act further 
frustrates this problem.256 
Furthermore, the private right of action takes on increased 
importance as a means of achieving the goals of the federal securities 
laws when one considers the current political and regulatory 
environment.  The SEC is frequently criticized for failing to 
adequately police markets and for routinely settling claims with 
wrongdoers, who are not required to admit the charges against them, 
rather than pursuing litigation.257  For instance, the fact that the SEC 
failed to identify the Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme, despite having 
made numerous inquiries into his business, generated a large 
backlash against the regulatory agency.258 
 
control over a controller person, such as a corporation, that has committed a 
violation of 10(b).  15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).  It imposes secondary liability on the 
controlling person for the fraud committed by the one who is controlled.  In re 
Merck & Co., Sec, Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., No. 2:05-cv-02367-SRC-MAS, 2011 WL 
3444199, at *36 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011). 
 255  See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164, 168 (1994) (setting forth the first element of a claim of aiding and 
abetting as requiring a showing of “a primary violation of Section 10(b)”); 
Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 635–36 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that, since 20(a) imposes derivative liability on control persons for 
violations committed by others, a plaintiff must plead an underlying primary 
violation to state a viable 20(a) claim).  See also, Rains, supra note 36, at 11 (“Courts 
generally have agreed that, at a minimum, a plaintiff must prove that the ‘controlled’ 
person committed a primary violation, and that the ‘control’ person, in some 
fashion, had ‘control’ over the ‘controlled’ person.”). 
 256  See supra notes 215–25 and accompanying text. 
 257  See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, What Happens When Wall Street Breaks the Law?  Not 
Much, CNN OPINION (Nov. 30, 2011, 7:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/30 
/opinion/etzioni-sec/index.html.  It should be noted that settling with defendants 
and allowing them to avoid admitting liability is not necessarily as negative a 
consequence as this critic would suggest.  Settling, rather than litigating, conserves 
already scarce resources.  Additionally, allowing defendants to not admit liability 
potentially allows recovery from the deeper pocket of the D&O insurer rather than 
the individual him or herself who may in effect be judgment-proof.  See infra notes 
271–274 and accompanying text for further discussion of this issue.  
 258  See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Court Documents Show How SEC Failed to Nab Madoff 
in 2006, CBS MONEY WATCH (Mar. 12, 2009, 4:09 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503983_162-4862380-503983.html.  
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Few critics seem to recognize, however, the limited resources 
that the SEC has to pursue such investigations.259  In 2011, for 
instance, the Congressional appropriations committee cut the SEC’s 
budget request for 2012 by $222.5 million,260 despite the fact that the 
SEC’s responsibilities were expanded by the enactment of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.261  In so 
cutting the budget request, the committee specifically referenced the 
SEC’s track record dealing with Ponzi schemes and pointed to 
concern over the federal deficit.262  Each of these rationales for 
cutting the SEC’s budget is puzzling.  It is likely, at least in part, 
because of the SEC’s lack of resources that it was unable to detect the 
Madoff scheme in the first place.263  Additionally, the SEC’s use of 
funds does not contribute to the deficit in that the SEC is financed by 
the fees it imposes on those it regulates and, in fact, the SEC actually 
generates revenue in the form of fines and disgorgements.264  It is 
likely that the SEC’s ability to police the market is subject to shifting 
political winds. 
Even before the SEC was charged with the expanded 
 
 259  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1027–28 (“Even though the SEC has broad authority 
to bring enforcement actions, its limited resources prevent it from detecting and/or 
prosecuting even the most flagrant abuses of the securities laws.”). 
 260  James B. Stewart, As a Watchdog Starves, Wall Street is Tossed A Bone, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jul, 15, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/business/budget 
-cuts-to-sec-reduce-its-effectiveness.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.   
 261  According to the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, & 
Urban Affairs, the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted to “create a sound economic 
foundation to grow jobs, protect consumers, rein in Wall Street and big bonuses, end 
bailouts and too big to fail, [and] prevent another financial crisis.”  S. COMM. ON 
BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, available at http://banking.senate.gov 
/public/_files/070110_Dodd_Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_comprehensive_summary
_Final.pdf.  It expands in the SEC’s regulatory reach in a number of ways.  For 
instance, Dodd-Frank gives the SEC authority to regulate over-the-counter 
derivatives, requires hedge funds and private equity advisors to register with the SEC, 
creates an Office of Credit Ratings at the SEC, and institutes a new SEC 
whistleblower program, just to name a few of the changes.  Id. 
 262  Stewart, supra note 260. 
 263  In fact, at least one investigation was stalled when the team investigating 
Madoff was shifted to a different, seemingly higher priority investigation, since the 
SEC did not have enough staff to conduct both simultaneously.  Id. In this light, the 
idea of cutting funding because of failure to adequately catch wrongdoers seems 
preposterous.  If the police were unable to prevent a rash of murders in a high-crime 
area of a city due to lack of police presence in that area, surely the most immediate 
response would not be that, since the police were incompetent, their budget should 
be cut, thereby leaving even fewer officers to monitor and respond to calls in the 
high-crime area. 
 264  Id. 
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responsibilities of Dodd-Frank, the SEC struggled with 
underfunding.265  Manpower is costly (and additional manpower is 
potentially unavailable due to a recent hiring freeze), litigation is 
expensive, and resources—such as sophisticated IT functions to ease 
the burden of document review and production in cases that are 
frequently document-intensive—are limited or nonexistent.266  As 
such, the SEC may find itself in the position of having to restrict its 
operations by settling cases it might otherwise litigate, closing 
investigations sooner than desired, and restricting investigations of 
overseas companies due to the expense of travel.267  Making sure the 
private right of action remains strong can help supplement the SEC 
enforcement arm, particularly in this political climate where the SEC, 
serving as Congress’s scapegoat for corporate greed, is struggling with 
underfunding. 
Additionally, allowing private litigants and the SEC to pursue 
claims against individual wrongdoers and secondary actors provides 
compensation to victims of fraud where otherwise no remedy would 
be available.  For instance, in Janus, JIF—the business trust set up to 
hold the mutual funds—was the only entity that could be held 
liable.268  But since it had no assets of its own with which to 
compensate plaintiffs, plaintiffs were left without a remedy.269 Even in 
instances where the issuer does have assets from which to satisfy 
claims, allowing recovery against corporate insiders and secondary 
actors removes the problem of the circular recovery whereby 
plaintiffs are limited to recovering only from the corporate entity 
itself, thereby reducing the share value of all shareholders’ stock, and 
effectively transferring wealth from the shareholders who are outside 
of the class of plaintiffs to those within.270  By allowing litigants to 
 
 265  The SEC regulates more than 35,000 institutions.  Under the new legislation, 
hedge fund advisors would be added as well.  Id. 
 266  Punctuating the resources issue is the stark disparity between the resources of 
the SEC and those it regulates.  “[I]n 2009 Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase . . . spent 
$4.6 billion each—four times the S.E.C.’s entire annual budget—on information 
technology alone.”  Id.  
 267  Id. 
 268  Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304. 
 269  Editorial, So No One’s Responsible, supra note 86. 
 270  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1075 (“Because damages in securities actions against 
issuers are ultimately borne by the issuer’s own shareholders, such lawsuits have been 
criticized as a series of pocket-shifting wealth transfers from shareholders who 
purchased outside the class period to shareholders who purchased during the class 
period.  This criticism does not apply to actions brought against secondary actors.”)  
Just as this criticism does not apply to actions brought against secondary actors, it 
would not apply to actions brought against corporate insiders, assuming 
indemnification by their corporate employers was not permitted. 
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proceed against the corporate insiders, and not just the corporate 
issuer, victims of fraud have an additional avenue of relief.  While 
allowing plaintiffs to pursue claims against corporate insiders might 
not provide the same deep pockets as does pursuing claims against 
secondary actors like investment banks and accounting firms,271 it 
would at least avoid the circularity problem, assuming 
indemnification from their corporate employers is not an option, and 
provide plaintiffs with another avenue for relief.272  And given the fact 
that executive compensation has soared in the past decade, some of 
these individuals may have fairly substantial personal assets capable of 
satisfying these claims. 
Even in those instances where the individual does not have 
substantial personal assets, such claims may be able to be satisfied out 
of corporate directors and officers (D&O) insurance policies.  It is 
true that D&O policies typically contain conduct-based exclusions, 
which exclude losses arising from certain conduct, such as fraud or 
intentional violation of the law.273  But such exclusions frequently are 
limited to situations where such fraudulent conduct has been 
established by a final adjudication of a court of competent 
jurisdiction.274  The SEC has long had a policy of resolving 
 
 271  For instance, in the Enron securities litigation, plaintiffs obtained 
approximately seven billion dollars in settlement from investment bank advisors 
alone.  Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1077. 
 272  See infra Part V.B.1 for additional discussion of indemnification considerations. 
 273  See, e.g., Farkas v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 861 F. Supp. 2d 
716 , 723 (E.D. Va. 2012) (involving a D&O policy with an exclusion for acts “arising 
out of, based upon or attributable to the committing in fact of any criminal, 
fraudulent or dishonest act, or any willful violation of any statute, rule or law.”); 
Endurance Am. Specialty Co. v. Lance-Kashian & Co., No. CV-F-10-1284-LJO-BAM, 
2011 WL 5417103, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (discussing a D&O policy with an 
exclusion for acts that are intentionally dishonest, fraudulent, or criminal); In re 
Enron Corp. Securities, Derivative & “Erisa” Litigation, 391 F. Supp. 2d 541, 559 
(S.D. Tex. 2005) (involving an exclusion to a D&O policy for acts “brought about or 
contributed to by the dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission”); 
see also, Kara Altenbaumer-Price, Loss of SEC ‘Neither Admit, Nor Deny’ Settlements Could 
Have Significant Impact, PLUS BLOG (May 22, 2012, 8:26 AM), 
http://plusblog.org/2012/05/22/loss-of-sec-neither-admit-nor-deny-settlements 
-could-have-significant-impact/.  
 274  See, e.g., Farkas, 861 F. Supp. 2d at 721–22 (interpreting a D&O policy’s 
exclusion for the commission of certain acts “in fact” as requiring a final adjudication 
or “at least some evidentiary proof that the insured reaped an illegal profit”) 
(quoting PMI Mortg. Ins. Co. v. Am Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., No. C 02–1774 PJH, 
2006 WL 825266, at *5–6 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 29, 2006)); Endurance Am. Specialty Co., 2011 
WL 5417103, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (analyzing a D&O policy with an exclusion for 
acts that are “intentionally dishonest, fraudulent, or [a] criminal act of any Insured 
as determined by a final adjudication . . . .”); In re Enron Corp., 391 F.Supp.2d at 572 
(interpreting a D&O policy with an exclusion for acts involving “dishonest, 
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enforcement actions without requiring the defendant to admit 
liability.275  Instead, the SEC frequently allows defendants to settle 
claims on a “neither admit, nor deny” basis.276  As such, in 
enforcement actions at least, the limits of a D&O policy may still be 
available to satisfy judgments.  Even when recovery under a D&O 
policy is not possible and where the individual defendant does not 
have substantial assets to satisfy the claim, the goal of deterrence is 
still satisfied by allowing litigants to pursue these individual 
wrongdoers. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  Legislative Adoption of the Creator Standard 
In the wake of Janus and its ensuing confusion in the lower 
courts about how to apply the “ultimate authority” test and the 
potential for the 10b-5 right of action for misrepresentation to be 
unreasonably curtailed, it is clear that legislative action is necessary.  
The extremely pro-business stance taken by the Supreme Court in 
Janus has left some wondering whether some businesses are not only 
too big to fail, but also “too big to be held accountable.”277  As such, 
just as Congress took up the issue of 10b-5 liability in the wake of the 
Central Bank decision, Congress must do so again now. 
Through Congressional action, the Janus “ultimate authority” 
 
fraudulent, criminal, or malicious act[s] or omission[s]” if a “final adjudication 
establishes that acts of active and deliberate dishonesty were committed . . . with 
actual dishonest purpose and intent and were material to the cause of action so 
adjudicated”). 
 275  Thomas O. Gorman, Neither Admit Nor Deny is Not the Issue in SEC Settlements, 




 276  The practice of allowing defendants to resolve litigation with the SEC through 
settlements on a neither admit nor deny basis was recently called into question by 
Judge Rakoff in SEC v. Citigroup when he rejected a settlement, citing the practice.  
827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  But the Second Circuit upheld the SEC’s 
practice on appeal.  SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 163–65 (2d 
Cir. 2012).  
 277  Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will 
Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (statement of the Honorable Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3d9031b47812de2592c
3baeba607fb62&wit_id=3d9031b47812de2592c3baeba607fb62-0-1.  Senator Leahy 
pointed out that this was the most pro-business Court in seventy-five years, noting 
that under Chief Justice Roberts, the Court has ruled in a pro-business fashion in 
sixty-one  percent of its cases. 
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test should be abandoned in favor of a version of the SEC’s proposed 
“creator” standard.278  Under the creator standard, there would be no 
limit on the number of individuals who could be held accountable 
for a particular misstatement.  In other words, any suggestion in Janus 
that there can be only one maker of a misstatement held responsible 
would be set aside.  Under the “creator” standard, individuals will be 
able to “make” a statement if they created it, wrote it, or played a 
substantial enough role in the creation or writing of it so as to be 
considered the author or co-author of the statement.279  This should 
be so even if the creator is not expressly publicly identified.280  Express 
attribution of a statement to an individual or entity could certainly be 
strong evidence suggesting that someone was a maker of a statement, 
but it would not be necessary to find liability and it would not limit 
liability solely to the person to whom the statement was expressly 
attributed. 
Using the creator standard instead of the ultimate authority test 
would serve to eliminate the flawed analogy presented in Janus of the 
relationship between the speechwriter and the speech giver.281  The 
Court’s notion that it is the speech giver who has ultimate authority 
over the statements delivered, not the speechwriter—and therefore it 
is the giver, not the writer, who should be held liable—leads to 
potentially haphazard results.  For instance, if it is only the speech 
giver who can be liable in that scenario, it becomes impossible to 
impose liability in the frequent circumstance where the equivalent of 
the speech giver (e.g., the CFO signing a public filing) does not have 
the requisite scienter.  Using the creator standard and abandoning 
the speechwriter analogy would enable plaintiffs to hold culpable 
individual corporate insiders accountable for the wrongdoing and 
reflect the corporate reality that it is typically not just one person who 
has responsibility for a statement. 
Replacing the ultimate authority test with the creator standard 
would also alleviate the problem that, to the extent that there is one 
 
 278  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra  
note 92, at 14. 
 279  Id.; see also, Cosenza, supra note 1, at 1047. 
 280  Id. 
 281  Additionally, lower courts and administrative agencies have already begun to 
abandon the analogy in their application of the ultimate authority test.  For instance 
in the administrative proceeding, In re Flannery, the administrative law judge held 
that the person who gave a presentation was not the one with ultimate authority over 
the content of the presentation because he was merely delivering the message 
created by another that he was asked to deliver as part of his job.  In re Flannery, 
Exchange Act Release No. 438, 2011 WL 5130058, at *38 (ALJ Oct. 28, 2011).  For a 
more complete discussion of this case, see supra Part III.A. 
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person who might be considered to have ultimate authority based on 
a public attribution of the statement to the individual, that person 
often does not have the requisite scienter for liability to attach.  For 
instance, under the creator standard, if a CFO signs a SOX 
certification attached to financials containing misstatements, that 
public attribution to the CFO might be seen as evidence that he was 
the (or one of the) creator(s) of the statement.  If the other elements 
of 10b-5 liability could be met, including scienter, he could be held 
liable.  But if the CFO was duped by other less senior officers within 
the enterprise into thinking the financials were true, that CFO would 
likely not have the requisite scienter to establish liability, unless he 
was severely reckless.  Under Janus, in this scenario, potentially no 
one would be held accountable (particularly if the wrongdoer’s 
scienter could not be imputed to the corporation).  Under the 
creator standard, however, though the CFO might not be liable, the 
less senior officers with culpability could be. 
Finally, by allowing the imposition of liability on corporate 
insiders and secondary actors in appropriate circumstances, beyond 
what is allowable under Janus, the creator standard will give victims of 
fraud additional avenues of relief over and above the relief from the 
issuer itself, thereby avoiding the problem of the circular recovery, or 
as in the case of Janus, no recovery at all.  This would serve to 
promote the underlying goals of the federal securities laws to deter 
and punish fraud, to compensate victims, and to increase investor 
confidence in the markets. 
Ideally, this legislative solution of adopting the creator standard 
would apply to the SEC enforcement action and to the private cause 
of action alike.  At a minimum, however, this standard should be 
adopted for SEC enforcement actions. 
B.  Judicial Considerations Prior to Congressional Action 
While waiting for congressional action to replace the “ultimate 
authority” test of Janus and resolve the question of who the “maker” 
of a statement is for 10b-5 purposes, district courts and circuit courts 
will be faced with considering two issues in particular: (1) how the 
issue of collective scienter should be resolved in light of Janus, and 
(2) whether the Janus ultimate authority test should be applied to 
other federal securities laws. 
1.  Collective Scienter Issue 
Courts looking at the issue of collective scienter should adopt a 
hybrid rule that does not go as far as the broadest forms of collective 
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scienter—allowing imputation of scienter from the aggregate 
knowledge of all employees—or even so far as the watered down 
version of collective scienter—allowing imputation so long as at least 
one management-level employee had scienter.282  But the proposed 
rule should also not reject collective scienter outright.  Specifically, 
rather than allowing imputation of the scienter only from the 
“maker” of the statement (which post-Janus would presumably be the 
one person or entity with “ultimate authority” over the statement), 
courts should allow imputation of scienter from anyone who 
contributed to the making of the statement.  In other words, courts 
should impose something of a “creator” standard to the issue of 
collective scienter.  This is not without precedent prior to Janus.283  At 
least one district court has considered this issue since Janus and held 
that the court can look not only to the state of mind of “the 
individual corporate official . . . who made the statement, but also 
[to] those who order or approve it or its making or issuance, or who 
furnish information or language for inclusion therein or the like.”284 
Critics of the collective scienter theory have pointed out that it 
places the onus of identifying employees with knowledge of the falsity 
of the statement on the corporation, an approach that “may be akin 
to finding a needle in a haystack.”285  Because the knowledge in those 
instances is so deeply embedded within the corporation, the 
corporation is in no better position than the SEC to detect the person 
with actual scienter and therefore, imposing liability on the 
corporation does not promote deterrence.286  Additionally, the costs 
of focusing perhaps “more [corporate] resources than appropriate 
on the area of corporate disclosures . . . outweigh [any] marginal 
benefits” that might result in the public disclosures.287  Critics have 
also argued that the use of collective scienter makes it difficult to 
predict what types of cases would be pursued and therefore difficult 
to counsel corporate clients on compliance.288 
But these concerns would be tempered by the fact that the form 
of collective scienter proposed here is more similar to the rule 
proposed in that line of cases rejecting collective scienter than it is to 
 
 282  See supra Part III.B.2 for a more thorough discussion of collective scienter. 
 283  Southland Securities Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 
(5th Cir. 2004); see also supra notes 201–204 and accompanying text. 
 284  Kerr v. Exobox Techs., CV No. H-10-4221, 2012 WL 201872, at *14 (S.D. Tex. 
Jan. 23, 2012) (citation omitted).  
 285  Bondi, supra note 164, at 26. 
 286  Id.  
 287  Id. at 27. 
 288  Id. at 28. 
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those jurisdictions that permit theories of collective scienter.  The 
limited form of collective scienter proposed here would merely serve 
to counter-act the potential effect of Janus of eliminating not only 
claims against secondary actors and corporate insiders, but also 
claims against the issuer itself.  With the new limitations imposed on 
asserting 10b-5 claims, Senator Patrick Leahy has commented that 
plaintiffs’ ability “to band together to hold corporations accountable” 
that have engaged in fraud “has been seriously undermined by the 
Supreme Court.”289  In the aftermath of Janus, the benefits of a weak 
form of collective scienter would outweigh the potential costs. 
Additionally, this proposal only applies to situations where 
scienter is imputed from the wrongdoer to the corporate issuer 
itself—it does not go so far as to say that the scienter of the 
wrongdoer should be able to be attributed to a different officer or 
employee.  If courts are willing to impute the scienter of the 
wrongdoer to the employee or officer to whom attribution is given, 
there is a real possibility there would be a significant chilling effect of 
such a rule that imposes liability on the CFO or other corporate 
officer merely for signing a public filing.  Though state corporate 
codes typically allow for indemnification of directors and sometimes 
officers when they are sued in their corporate capacity, such 
indemnification provisions are typically limited.  For instance, under 
the Model Business Corporation Act, indemnification by the 
corporation is only permissible if the individual acted in good faith 
and believed his actions were in the best interests of the 
corporation.290  Corporations are also free to put additional 
limitations on indemnification in their charter documents,291 and 
some elect to limit indemnification to directors or officers who did 
not act in a way that was reckless or involved willful misconduct.292  
For a director or officer to be found liable for (or guilty of) 10b-5 
securities violations, the showing of scienter would likely be enough 
to establish that indemnification would not be appropriate.293  
 
 289  Barriers to Justice and Accountability: How the Supreme Court’s Recent Rulings Will 
Affect Corporate Behavior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 
(2011) (statement of the Honorable Patrick Leahy, U.S. Senator), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3d9031b47812de2592c
3baeba607fb62&wit_id=3d9031b47812de2592c3baeba607fb62-0-1.  
 290  MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 8.51 (2008); see also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 
8, §145 (2011).  And, in a criminal proceeding, indemnification is only permissible if 
the defendant had no reasonable cause to believe his or her conduct was unlawful.  
See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145. 
 291  See, e.g., WISC. STAT. § 180.0852 (2012). 
 292  Rains et al., supra note 101, at 5. 
 293  In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, 740 F. Supp. 149, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) 
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Moreover, many courts have expressly held that indemnification is 
not available for federal securities law claims, especially for claims 
involving intentional—rather than negligent—misconduct.294  The 
threat of liability without indemnification—even where the accused 
was an unknowing participant—could have a negative impact on the 
ability of corporations to find qualified individuals willing to serve in 
these roles.295  This proposal attempts to avoid that outcome by 
allowing courts to impute scienter of the wrongdoer, but only for 
purposes of assessing the corporation’s liability—not that of other 
corporate insiders. 
Arguably, if Congress were to adopt the creator standard of 
liability, thereby rejecting the Janus standard, the issue of collective 
scienter would take care of itself.  Even in jurisdictions that reject 
notions of collective scienter, scienter can be imputed from the 
“maker” of the statement.  If the “maker” is defined using the creator 
standard, the proposed rule for collective scienter articulated above 
would, by default, be adopted.  Therefore, the proposed judicial 
action is only necessary as a stop-gap until a legislative solution is 
 
(holding that because indemnification is not available to parties who have knowingly 
and willfully violated the securities laws, and because scienter is required to be liable 
for 10(b) violations, indemnification was not available); see also EDWARD BRODSKY & 
M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORP. OFFS. & DIRS., DUTIES & LIABS. § 19:9 (2011). 
 294  Dept. of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 747 F. Supp. 922, 931 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); Alvarado Partners, L.P. v. Mehta, 723 F. Supp. 540, 549 (D. Colo. 1989); 
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969).  In fact, 
courts have consistently held that indemnification with respect to willful violations of 
the securities laws, such as 10(b) of the Exchange Act, is against public policy.  
BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 293, at §19:9.  Even in cases involving securities laws 
that require only a negligence standard of liability, some courts have found that 
indemnification is inappropriate.  Id.  The exception to the basic rule that directors 
and officers cannot recover for securities laws claims is that they will be able to 
recover when they did not admit liability or they otherwise prove they were not at 
fault.  Greenwald v. Am. Medcare Corp., 666 F. Supp. 489, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 
Raychem Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 853 F. Supp. 1170, 1177–79 (N.D. Cal. 1994).  
The PSLRA, for instance, allows for indemnification where the defendant prevails.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).  It should be noted that at least one state’s 
corporate code expressly provides that directors and officers can be indemnified for 
violations of securities laws.  WISC. STAT. § 180.0859 (2012).  But such 
indemnification is still subject to the other provisions of the code, and elsewhere in 
the code, indemnification is disallowed for behavior involving willful misconduct or a 
transaction from which the director or officer received an improper personal 
benefit.  WISC. STAT. § 180.0851(2)(a) (2012).  As such, indemnification would likely 
still not be possible in the face of a 10b-5 violation where scienter has been 
established.  
 295  One way that this chilling effect is mitigated is through a corporation’s offer to 
indemnify defendants for settlements in which they have not admitted liability.  
BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 293, at § 19:9; see supra note 275 and accompanying 
text for further discussion. 
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enacted. 
It is not just the courts that will have the opportunity to act in 
the interim before a legislative solution is adopted; corporations may 
be able to take ameliorating actions as well.  Specifically, if courts 
continue to find that express attribution is enough to satisfy the Janus 
test, it may be wise for corporations and corporate insiders to begin 
to use strategic allocation of liability through attribution.296  For 
instance, a board of directors might adopt a resolution delegating 
“ultimate authority” over particular public statements to a specific 
officer or employee.297  It is not clear whether such a non-public 
attribution would be effective after Janus to immunize all others from 
liability who are not mentioned in the corporate resolution.  This 
would likely be analyzed as a case of “implicit” attribution.298  But even 
a decision by a corporation to allocate attribution publicly—by having 
a particular officer sign a filing for instance—may be ineffective.  
While it may be a seemingly good prophylactic measure by 
corporations to distribute potential liability to whom it considers to 
be the appropriate parties, it is unclear what effect this will have on 
liability distribution.  For instance, if this is in fact a successful means 
of limiting the universe of potential “makers” of a statement to one 
individual, the question will become whether or not such a “maker”—
for instance, one who has signed a public filing—will have the 
requisite scienter to find 10b-5 liability, as discussed in Part III.A 
supra.  Even though the effectiveness of such express attribution to 
cut off liability to some and assign it to others is still in question, 
however, attribution will certainly at least be a factor in courts’ 
decisions and may help corporations allocate liability to the person or 
persons within the entity who should most appropriately bear 
responsibility.299 
2.  Application to Other Federal Securities Laws 
In addressing the issue of whether Janus should be extended 
beyond 10b-5 to other federal securities laws such as Section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act, Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, and Section 
34(b) of the Investment Company Act, district courts should 
 
 296  Rains et al., supra note 101, at 7.   
 297  Id. at 4. 
 298  Obviously, questions of implicit attribution are even more complicated than 
those of express attribution.  While Janus seems to specifically account for this 
scenario of implicit attribution, the Court did not illustrate what kinds of actions on 
the part of a defendant would allow for “implicit attribution” of misstatements to an 
individual, such that he or she would be considered the maker of that statement. 
 299  Rains et al., supra note 101, at 7. 
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continue to follow the lead of the majority of the handful of district 
courts that have already decided this issue and similarly hold that 
Janus should not be so extended.  Federal securities laws that do not 
contain the operative word “make” should easily be excluded from 
application of the Janus rule.  And those that provide for the 
operative word, such as Section 34(b) of the Investment Company 
Act, frequently do not include private rights of action.  Therefore, the 
policy behind the Janus decision—to curb the expansion of the 
private right of action—would not be served by application of the 
rule in these cases.  Extending Janus to these other areas of securities 
laws would unnecessarily and unreasonably further limit the ability of 
private litigants and the SEC to fulfill the goals of the federal 
securities laws. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A year has passed since the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Janus.  In Janus, the Court attempted to curb the 
expansion of the 10b-5 private right of action by providing a bright 
line rule between what constitutes a primary violation of 10b-5—and 
thus actionable by private litigants—and what merely constitutes a 
secondary violation for which private litigants should have no 
recourse.  In the year since the opinion, however, activity in the lower 
courts has shown that this rule does not provide the clear line that it 
purports to. 
In the wake of Janus, lower courts have been faced with a 
number of questions for which the Supreme Court provided no 
obvious answers.  For instance, generally the lower courts are in 
agreement that Janus applies to corporate insiders, not just secondary 
actors as in Janus.  But they are not necessarily in agreement as to 
how Janus should apply.300  Some lower courts have dismissed claims 
involving insiders on the grounds that these individuals did not have 
ultimate authority over the statement.301  Other courts have allowed 
claims against insiders to proceed where the misstatements were 
expressly publicly attributed to the insiders.302  Even if these claims 
are allowed to proceed to trial, however, success of the plaintiffs on 
the merits seems unlikely in light of the other requirements of 10b-5 
liability—specifically, the requirement that the defendant have the 
requisite state of mind.  In such cases, the individual director or 
 
 300  See supra notes 111–33 and accompanying text. 
 301  See supra notes 112–28 and accompanying text. 
 302  See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text.  
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officer to whom a statement is publicly attributed—such as the CFO 
signing a SOX certification or a chief marketing officer making a 
press announcement—may have no reason to know that the data he 
or she is signing off on contains fraudulent information.  While there 
may be policy reasons for holding this individual liable for the 
misstatement anyway, such liability will not attach pursuant to Rule 
10b-5 because of a lack of scienter.  And the person who actually 
prepared the fraudulent information upon which the public 
announcement was made also will not be liable under 10b-5 because, 
after Janus, such an individual did not “make” the misrepresentation.  
It would seem that Justice Breyer’s prediction—that “guilty 
management” might fool both the board and management, yet, after 
Janus, no one would be liable303—will have come true. 
Yet even more troubling than the impact of Janus on the 
potential liability of culpable insiders is the fact that, in many 
jurisdictions, Janus has the potential to thwart claims against even the 
issuers to which the misstatements are attributed.  In jurisdictions 
rejecting theories of collective scienter, courts will only impute the 
scienter of an individual to the entity in instances where the 
individual also was the “maker” of the statement.  Since Janus limits 
the universe of who can be a potential “maker,” there is a distinct 
possibility that the insider who is considered the “maker” of the 
misstatement will not be the same as the insider who has scienter.  If 
the maker and the individual with scienter are not the same person, a 
court may find that the scienter of the individual cannot be imputed 
to the corporation, and therefore the issuer will not be found liable.  
In such a circumstance, a plaintiff may be entirely without recourse 
for a 10b-5 violation.  Even in jurisdictions that have historically 
allowed a theory of collective scienter, the question of whether such 
theory survives Janus remains unanswered. 
Moreover, since the Janus holding most likely applies to the SEC 
just as it does to corporate insiders, the SEC’s enforcement arm is just 
as limited by the holding as are private litigants.  And even though 
the SEC has the ability to pursue other secondary claims—such as for 
aiding and abetting and for control person liability—each of these 
requires a showing of an underlying primary violation.  Since any 
underlying violation would be subject to Janus, the SEC’s ability to 
pursue these secondary violations is limited.  Finally, since some 
lower courts are extending the Janus ruling to actions brought under 
other federal securities laws, the SEC’s reach may be even further 
 
 303  Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2310 
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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limited. 
As these cases continue to work their way through the lower 
courts and into the courts of appeals, we will hopefully see resolution 
of some of the uncertainty surrounding the Janus decision.  But as the 
courts apply Janus to corporate insiders, and fail to resolve the 
collective scienter issue, issuers and insiders alike will be able to 
perpetrate frauds unchecked.  Corporations and corporate insiders 
should not be able essentially to launder public misstatements by 
making sure the corporate mouthpiece to whom they are attributed is 
not the same as the person with the fraudulent intent. 
A legislative solution appears necessary to remedy the injustice 
that Janus promotes.  Through Congressional action, the ultimate 
authority test should be abandoned in favor of the SEC’s proposed 
creator standard, and this standard should apply to both SEC 
enforcement actions and the private right of action.  This would allow 
imposition of liability on those who created a statement, wrote it, or 
played a substantial enough role in its making so as to be considered 
an author or co-author.  Further, this would alleviate the problem of 
not being able to establish one person or entity that has both the 
requisite scienter and is considered the maker of the statement. 
In the absence of legislative action, courts should resolve the 
collective scienter issue by adopting a hybrid rule that allows 
imputation of scienter not only from the maker of the statement but 
also from anyone who contributed to the making of the statement in 
such a way to be considered its author or co-author.  This would 
ensure that the issuer will not be able to avoid liability simply because 
the person with the scienter was not also the person with “ultimate 
authority” over the statement.  Instead, scienter of any individual who 
played a large enough role in the authoring of the misstatement 
could be imputed to the corporation.  Finally, courts should refuse to 
extend the Janus rule to claims involving other federal securities laws, 
such as Section 17(a) of the Securities Act and Section 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act.  Corporate securities fraud is as big of an issue as it 
ever has been and reform is necessary in order to ensure the sanctity 
and vitality of the U.S. capital markets. 
 
